To allow subordinates to make decisions boldly while still maintaining control from superiors.

When Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, I had been working for about five years. At that time, I worried that many domestic businesses would not be able to withstand the competitive pressure, potentially leading to mass bankruptcies and a very high price for the economy.

Looking back over nearly two decades, I realize I wasn't wrong to foresee the risks, but I underestimated the adaptability of businesses and the economy as a whole when forced into real competition. Certain skills are only developed when people are given autonomy, take responsibility, and can no longer rely on others to make decisions for them.

I recall that story when looking at the process by which our Party has persistently promoted decentralization and delegation of power, from Resolution 27/2022 on continuing to build and perfect the socialist rule of law state of Vietnam in the new period to the directive of General Secretary and President To Lam at the National Conference summarizing one year of operation of the overall organizational model of the political system and the three-tiered government model on July 1st.

At the conference, the General Secretary and President called for strengthening decentralization and delegation of power while ensuring resources and controlling power, and pointed out the risk of superiors not having a firm grasp of the grassroots level or subordinates having to seek too much advice. Including the percentage of tasks at the commune level requiring approval from superiors in the monitoring indicators shows that decentralization must continue to be measured, bottlenecks identified, and adjustments made.

If power is delegated, who will control those who are given power?

This is one of the most difficult questions regarding delegation of authority. But if, for the sake of control, important matters still require approval from superiors, then the authority is delegated on paper, while the actual decision-making power remains at the top. Subordinates find it difficult to act proactively, superiors are overloaded, and their responsibilities become blurred.

International experience shows that this problem is not new. The European Charter on Local Government stipulates that administrative oversight of local authorities must be based on law; with authority belonging to the locality, oversight is primarily aimed at ensuring compliance with the law and constitutional principles, while the level of intervention must be proportionate to the interests that need to be protected.

Behind that seemingly legal wording lies a simple principle: checks and balances do not necessarily mean that superiors have the right to decide everything for their subordinates. If a matter falls within the local jurisdiction, the superior can question whether the decision is legal, exceeds their authority, involves a conflict of interest, and meets standards. But if the superior can always say, "I think there's a better alternative, so you have to follow it," then it's difficult to say that the decision-making power has truly been delegated.

New Zealand also sets a notable line. Local Government Act requires the Auditor-General to review compliance with the law, the quality of information, and the assumptions underlying long-term planning, but not to comment on the value of policy choices. The auditor is entitled to see if decisions are within authority, follow proper procedures, and are not self-serving, and they do not automatically become a second-tier decision-maker.

That distinction is very close to the directive of General Secretary and President To Lam at the National Conference on studying, understanding, and implementing the Resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the 14th Central Committee on July 29, and implementing Resolution No. 17 on July 24.

When assigning roles among agencies within the political system, the General Secretary and President emphasized the need to ensure interconnectedness between leadership, institutionalization, implementation, and supervision, but "without replacing each other's functions." In my opinion, this is also an important principle of decentralization: supervision must help ensure that delegated authority is exercised correctly, rather than turning the supervisor into a second-level decision-maker.

This distinction is important because decision-making power always comes with the possibility of making suboptimal decisions. If every unsuccessful decision risks becoming a matter of personal responsibility, the safest approach would be to refrain from making a decision, or to seek guidance from superiors before deciding. In such cases, the very mechanisms of control could render the delegation of power ineffective.

But giving subordinates greater autonomy doesn't necessarily mean lax control. Brazil is a noteworthy example. Its Federal Court of Auditors uses the Alice system to collect bidding data, compare price data, identify anomalies, and then alert auditors. The machine doesn't replace humans in concluding violations, but it helps identify which files require closer examination. When power leaves a digital footprint, superiors can see more without necessarily having to intervene more.

In other words, empowering decision-makers does not mean empowering them to conceal those decisions. But having the right to monitor does not automatically mean having the right to reconsider decisions.

The hierarchical structure of authority can be visualized as lanes. In the "green zone," decisions are made independently by those within their authority, within limits, and without any risk. When irregularities in transaction value, conflicts of interest, complaints, or deviations from the norm arise, the work enters the "yellow zone": those with authority still make decisions but must provide more explanations. Only when legal limits are exceeded or serious corruption or abuse of power is detected does the work enter the "red zone," and the intervention of higher authorities is activated.

A warning does not equate to a request for permission. If every warning means the application has to stop pending approval from a superior, then new technology is only digitizing the old "request-and-grant" mechanism.

This approach aligns with the new requirements of Resolution No. 05 of the 2nd Plenum of the 14th Central Committee on reforming and improving the effectiveness of Party inspection, supervision, and discipline, which calls for shifting the focus of inspection and supervision to prevention, warning of violations, and increased data-driven oversight. In his speech on July 29th, the General Secretary and President also requested that the information system serve management, warning, supervision, and accountability, rather than creating additional procedures or formal reporting. Therefore, effective control does not necessarily mean more control, but rather controlling in the right places and identifying risks earlier.

From prior permission to data-driven control and accountability.

Based on those experiences, Vietnam can gradually shift the focus of power control in three directions.FirstFrom seeking prior permission to clearly defining the boundaries of authority: What constitutes independent decision-making, what thresholds require reporting, what cases are off-limits, and who bears ultimate responsibility. Decentralization is not just about transferring tasks, but about transferring full authority, resources, data, tools, and accountability.

Next,From mass inspections to data- and risk-based monitoring. A lean administration cannot simply delegate more authority and create more layers of paperwork to control it. Data must help detect anomalies early, allowing inspectors and auditors to focus on what is truly necessary.

Final,The focus shifts from observing whether subordinates are acting in accordance with superiors' instructions to examining whether their actions are within their authority, legal, transparent, and effective. A decision made within the proper authority and procedures, based on professional expertise and without self-interest, should be viewed differently from intentional circumvention of the law, concealment of conflicts of interest, or profiteering.

The directive issued on July 29th also highlighted a very noteworthy point: commune-level authorities must "mature through the organization and implementation of their work," striving to fulfill their assigned tasks and not passing on responsibilities to higher levels. Therefore, decentralization not only requires higher levels to know how to delegate authority but also demands that lower levels dare to accept authority, dare to make decisions, and take responsibility.

There's another principle that's rarely mentioned: those in control must also have limits to their power. Inspectors, auditors, and superiors all need oversight power, but it must be clear what to inspect, when to suspend subordinate decisions, the extent of intervention, and when that power ends. If the decision-making power of local authorities has boundaries, then the intervention power of superiors also needs boundaries.

Successful delegation should therefore perhaps not be measured solely by the number of tasks delegated. A more important indicator is: how many of the tasks already within their authority still require approval from their superiors? Those empowered must clearly understand their authority limits, possess the necessary qualifications to make decisions, and be accountable for those decisions. Those at higher levels must be able to identify risks, detect deviations, and intervene when necessary, but also maintain the discipline to avoid making decisions on matters they have truly delegated authority to.

Empowerment and control are not two opposing goals. The clearer it is defined who has the power to decide, who has the power to supervise, and where each power ends, the stronger both initiative and control can become.