Vietnamese special forces and commandos during the Tet Offensive of 1968.

Vietnamese special forces soldiers on makeshift rafts along the coast of Nam Ha province, 1972.

On March 19, 1967, the special forces were officially recognized by the Party, the Government, and the General Staff as a branch of the Vietnam People's Armed Forces.

President Ho Chi Minh, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, Minister of National Defense, visited and spoke with delegates of special forces officers and soldiers on the anniversary of the branch's founding.

President Ho Chi Minh said: "Special forces means special work, a special honor that requires special effort… For special forces, the word 'special' encompasses everything, from training to going into battle and returning."

Intelligence must be exceptionally flexible. Technique must be exceptionally well-trained. Political stance must be exceptionally firm…

Discipline must be exceptionally strict. The determination to defeat the enemy, the determination to annihilate the enemy, must also be exceptionally high" (Ho Chi Minh)Complete works,Volume 12, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 1996, p. 243.

President Ho Chi Minh, the Central Party Committee, and the Central Military Commission decided to establish the Special Forces at this time with the immediate intention of using special forces as a shock force in the general offensive.

In the North, in 1967, the Special Forces trained 3,835 soldiers, trained 457 platoon deputy officers, and provided refresher and transfer training for 527 officers from platoon leader to battalion commander levels.

In implementing the Party's strategic resolve, the armed forces reinforced the battlefields with 2,563 officers and soldiers.

Organized into one battalion, 40 teams, 7 battalion-level officer frameworks, and 30 team-level officer frameworks.

In the battlefields of South Vietnam, by the end of 1967, the special forces commando unit had tens of thousands of soldiers, comprising 1 regiment, 2 battalions (equivalent to regiments), 21 battalions, 58 teams, and hundreds of platoots and squads.

The armed team of the Propaganda Department of the Saigon - Gia Dinh Special Zone (T4) before deploying to participate in the Tet Offensive of 1968.

The special forces were organized into a system, with top-down leadership to advise commanders of various fronts and units in planning and combat operations.

The Special Forces Command, along with the various fronts, advised the Ministry to adjust forces for deployment in strategic areas.

By the end of 1967, in the outskirts of Saigon, sectors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 each had one to two elite infantry battalions, lightly and heavily equipped, trained in commando tactics.

Saigon's special forces and commandos built a system of corridors, staging areas, and civilian bases within the city, suburbs, and around important targets, including 19 political bases, 225 liaison families, and 400 hiding places for troops, weapons, and food supplies.

In Hue, within the city and surrounding areas, there were 3 special forces battalions and 10 commando teams.

The people in the Viễn Chinh, Đức Thái, Mực Tra, Dương Mông areas… had prepared food supplies and hundreds of secret tunnels to hide the special forces soldiers close to their attack targets.

In other cities throughout the South, special forces units of the Region, military districts, divisions, main regiments, and special forces of provinces and districts were all stationed in key areas and important targets.

Just before the Tet Offensive of 1968, special forces and commando units were ordered to disperse into numerous groups, using various routes to blend in with the crowds shopping for Tet, secretly concealing troops, weapons, and ammunition in the homes of key families or final assembly points, while simultaneously conducting a final reconnaissance of their targets.

Tens of thousands of special forces and commando soldiers, along with hundreds of tons of specialized weapons, were deployed and hidden deep within enemy territory.

Our troops are like sharp knives, ready to stab straight into the enemy's throat when the order to attack is given.

On the night of January 30th and the morning of January 31st, 1968, the General Offensive and Uprising of our army and people broke out simultaneously, powerfully, and unexpectedly in Saigon, Hue, and many other cities, towns, and townships in the South.

Twenty minutes later, the American reinforcements arrived but were stopped by our forces at the main gate.

By morning, a platoon of American soldiers had managed to get inside, and fierce fighting ensued between our forces and the enemy within the embassy grounds.

We captured the first floor, then advanced to the second and third floors.

Faced with the tenacious fighting spirit of our soldiers, the Americans had to use helicopters to drop reinforcements from rooftops.

At dawn, due to the lack of reinforcements, the battle ended with 16 brave soldiers killed in action. The team leader was seriously wounded and captured by the enemy.

The force that attacked Saigon Radio Station consisted of 12 soldiers from Commando Team No. 4, under the overall command of Comrade Nguyen Van Tang, head of Group 3-4-5, and commanded by Comrade Nam Loc.

Our soldiers attacked and disrupted the radio broadcasts from 2 to 5 a.m., but enemy reinforcements counterattacked, so we failed to capture our objective.

Commando Unit No. 5, consisting of 15 soldiers led by Comrade Ngo Hoai Thanh, advanced into the Independence Palace, attacked the palace gate on Nguyen Du Street, and eliminated the guards, but were unable to deploy due to fierce enemy resistance.

The enemy sent armored vehicles to reinforce our ranks, forcing us to retreat. In this battle, 8 soldiers were killed and 7 were captured by the enemy.

At other targets, the commando teams advanced and held them until morning, but the spearhead battalions of the sectors were unable to provide timely reinforcements.

The commando soldiers fought to the very last moment, upholding the heroic spirit of the Saigon commandos during the historic Tet Offensive of 1968.

In Hue, the special forces included 3 battalions and 6 commando teams.

Before Tet, the units marched in multiple directions, crossing numerous rivers, streams, and enemy outposts to reach their assembly points safely and on time.

In the North, special forces and commandos were tasked with attacking the enemy's 1st Infantry Division headquarters at Mang Cá, the airfield and warehouse area at Tây Lộc, and the Đại Nội area, alongside the infantry.

Heading south, special forces and infantry attacked the South Vietnamese armored regiment base at Tam Thai and the US infantry battalion at Nam Giao.

The special forces and commando units in Hue were not large, but together with 8 infantry battalions, they captured and secured 39 important targets in the city.

Special forces played a key role in capturing these targets, destroying hundreds of tanks, military vehicles, and aircraft, killing and capturing nearly a thousand enemy soldiers, and, together with local armed forces, launching a strong and widespread popular uprising, controlling many areas for extended periods, some areas for up to 25 days and nights, including the Imperial Citadel.

From 5:00 AM on January 31, 1968, the flag of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam fluttered atop the flagpole in front of Ngo Mon Gate.

In Hue, although coordination between special forces and infantry battalions improved, it was still not tight enough, and lacked timely reinforcement, thus failing to achieve the initial effectiveness that the special forces had demonstrated in their capture, such as:

We couldn't capture the enemy's 1st Infantry Division headquarters, only besieged it throughout the battle for Hue. We only managed to hold the airfield and the Tay Loc warehouse area for one day…

During the Tet Offensive of 1968, in cities, towns, and other areas throughout South Vietnam, special forces were assigned the core task of capturing the most critical and strategic targets such as sub-districts, districts, special zones, provincial headquarters, district capitals, administrative buildings, police stations, commando and special forces units, commando and special operations units at all levels of the US and South Vietnamese forces, advisory centers, prisons, etc.

These targets were captured and controlled entirely or partially by the special forces, creating favorable conditions for the people to rise up, eliminate ringleaders and cruel oppressors, dismantle the puppet regime, and seize control for a certain period of time.

The commandos also attacked a series of large enemy depots such as Hanh Thong Tay, Nha Be, Long Binh (January 31), An Khe (February 17), and Deo Son (February 24), burning hundreds of millions of tons of enemy fuel, bombs, and ammunition, causing them logistical difficulties in combat.

The battle at Long Binh General Depot alone caused the enemy's artillery positions in "Tactical Zone 3" to fire sparingly due to a shortage of ammunition.

The commandos also attacked numerous tank and armored vehicle bases, artillery positions, and important transportation bridges.

In particular, the 126th Naval Commando Unit disrupted enemy waterway transport on the Cua Viet River from the last few months of 1967 to the beginning of 1968, besieged the Cua Viet port, destroyed 14 enemy ships, and blocked the section of the river from Thanh Xuan to Cua Viet.

During the operations from late 1967 to mid-1968, culminating in the Tet Offensive, the Naval Special Forces bravely fought hundreds of battles, sinking or damaging more than 100 enemy warships and military transport ships, killing thousands of enemy soldiers, destroying dozens of bridges, and numerous enemy warehouses and war equipment; contributing to the overall victory of the entire front.

Our special forces and commando units were truly the spearhead of the Tet Offensive and Uprising of 1968, and they successfully completed their assigned tasks.