The battle of wits between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger in Paris.

The four-party talks in Paris began in 1969, but stalled in public sessions. To break the deadlock, the US and Hanoi arranged a secret channel, with Le Duc Tho and Kissinger as the key figures.

Le Duc Tho, originally from Nam Dinh province, joined the revolution at a young age and spent time in various prisons, from Hoa Lo to Son La and Con Dao. During the Tet Offensive of 1968, he was assigned to reinforce the Central Committee of the Southern Region. Later, President Ho Chi Minh appointed him as a special advisor to the head of the diplomatic delegation, Xuan Thuy, at the Paris Peace Accords. At that time, he was 57 years old and a member of the Politburo.

In his memoirs, Kissinger describes Le Duc Tho as having graying hair, a dignified bearing, always wearing a gray or maroon suit, and large, bright eyes. He described Tho as very calm, with an attitude that "couldn't be criticized, except once or twice."

Kissinger was the White House's Special Advisor on National Security, a former Harvard University professor, and a skilled diplomat with deep knowledge of Vietnam.

First meeting

Le Duc Tho and Kissinger met for the first time on February 21, 1970, at 11 Darthé Street, Choisy-le-roi, Paris. When Kissinger arrived, Xuan Thuy greeted him and led him into a small living room. "This was a historic moment. Two men completely different in social background, nature, and political ideals met and then engaged in intense debates for three years to find a solution to the Vietnam problem," recalled diplomat Luu Van Loi, secretary to Le Duc Tho, in his book.The negotiations between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger in Paris.

Apologies for his lateness and a request for confidentiality regarding the meeting, Kissinger affirmed that the US wanted to negotiate in good faith and seriously, but noted that the situation in the US was more favorable to Nixon, while the situation in South Vietnam was more difficult for Hanoi. Hanoi also no longer had the same level of international support as before. The US was not rigid and wanted a practical, not just theoretical, end to the war.

Kissinger emphasized that progress in negotiations depended on not escalating violence in the South. After the war ended, the US would help Vietnam modernize and rebuild the country and "would never again be a threat to Vietnam's independence." Before concluding, Kissinger apologized for speaking at length, but added, "Harvard professors always speak for 55 minutes."

Advisor Le Duc Tho (center) at negotiations with Henry Kissinger, January 13, 1973. Photo:VNA

Later that same day, Le Duc Tho said that Kissinger's assessment of the battlefield was inaccurate. "That's his right. For the past 15 years, when assessing the balance of forces between the two sides, you have been very wrong about us," Le Duc Tho said, not forgetting to mention that the Vietnamization of the war was beginning to fail.

The advisor to the Hanoi delegation asserted that no matter what the US did, it would not change the course of the war. "My people have been deceived many times already; to resolve the issue, we must be honest," Mr. Tho said. Before concluding his speech, Mr. Tho emphasized: "Of the two paths, peace and war, you should choose one. If you choose the path of peace, we can resolve the issue peacefully."

Negotiations are at a standstill.

In early October 1972, after Hanoi presented the draft Paris Agreement, Le Duc Tho and Kissinger basically agreed on many terms and estimated a timeframe for signing. Kissinger said he would go to Hanoi to initial the agreement, to which Le Duc Tho jokingly remarked, "I might have to parachute in," because crossing the Red River at that time required a pontoon bridge. However, the US delayed implementation, and Kissinger did not go to Hanoi as planned.

At the November meeting, Kissinger tried to ease tensions by inviting Le Duc Tho to lecture at Harvard University. In response, Tho read a prepared five-page speech outlining Hanoi's goodwill and denouncing American duplicity. "We have been deceived by the Japanese, the French, and the Americans, but never as blatantly as this time," Tho said sharply, and questioned Kissinger, "You once said that mutual understanding and trust were necessary, and then you reversed yourself. Do you think we understand what kind of person you are?"

Henry Kissinger, White House National Security Advisor (center), negotiates with advisor Le Duc Tho in France on January 13, 1973. Photo:VNA

Kissinger explained that the protracted war meant that only when approaching a solution did he realize the complexities of the issues he hadn't considered. He promised to complete most of the text this week, but he demanded revisions to most chapters of the agreement, especially those concerning the ceasefire, troop withdrawal, and internal politics in South Vietnam.

The US demanded the removal of the name of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam from the preamble and other details of the agreement; the withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam; and the refusal to recognize the existence of two governments, two armies, and two territories in South Vietnam. Kissinger also said nothing about his responsibility to heal the wounds of war in Vietnam.

Diplomat Luu Van Loi recounted that Le Duc Tho had reminded him that Nixon had once given a diplomatic note to Hanoi affirming that the agreement was "considered complete" and criticizing Kissinger's arguments.

Mr. Tho clearly stated the role of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South and on the international stage. For many years, the South has been divided into three zones: controlled by the Saigon government, the liberation army, and disputed areas. Kissinger's demand to abolish the zones controlled by the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the liberation army) is something that the US and Saigon forces have never been able to do before. This proposal is unreasonable.

Mr. Tho rejected the US demand for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. He argued that the Vietnamese people had the right to resist aggression and that the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops could not be equated with the withdrawal of American troops. "Raising the issue in that way is unjustified, immoral, political, and legal," Mr. Tho countered Kissinger.

Mr. Tho maintained his stance that if Hanoi released American prisoners of war, Saigon should release all the South Vietnamese civilian personnel still being held captive. "Have you ever seen a war in the world where, after it ends, one side returns the captured prisoners while the other side keeps them?" Mr. Tho continued to question Kissinger.

Kissinger agreed to some of Le Duc Tho's proposals, but there were still many disagreements between the two sides. Tho once directly asked, "Do you gentlemen want to negotiate further? If the advisor doesn't want to, then we'll stop. But if you want to discuss further, we will, but there must be reciprocity."

The final round

On December 18, 1972, as Le Duc Tho arrived home from Gia Lam airport, American B-52s began bombing Hanoi, Hai Phong, and many other cities. However, Nixon's bombing plan to reverse the situation failed, and meetings between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger resumed in early 1973. This was also the final round between the two leading to the signing of the agreement.

"Advisor Le Duc Tho arrived in Paris in the glory of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the air," Luu Van Loi described.

Unlike usual, the Vietnamese delegation did not greet Kissinger at the gate. Hanoi showed coldness towards the Americans, after 12 days and nights of intense fighting in the skies over Hanoi. "You used the pretext of interrupted negotiations to bomb North Vietnam just as I arrived home. Your actions were blatant and brutal. You thought you could subdue us, but you were wrong. You yourselves made the negotiations difficult and tarnished America's honor," Le Duc Tho criticized the US.

Kissinger explained that Hanoi's negotiating style in late 1972 led Washington to believe it was an attempt to prolong the process and not resolve the issue. When Kissinger suggested he refrain from further criticism, Mr. Tho replied, "I've restrained myself considerably, but world public opinion, journalists, and figures in America have used far harsher language."

Advisor Le Duc Tho and Dr. Henry Kissinger congratulate each other after initialing the Paris Agreement on January 23, 1973. Photo:VNA

The method of signing the agreement was a technical issue, but it was of interest to all four parties involved in the negotiations. Le Duc Tho demanded that both sides sign and that all four sides sign. Kissinger disagreed, proposing three options, but none included the name of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

Kissinger then proposed a four-party agreement, but with each party signing a separate sheet, and all four sheets combined into a single agreement; the signatories would all state their positions. Both sides agreed to this arrangement.

Mr. Le Duc Tho proposed adding a Protocol on reparations. Kissinger said the US would contribute to healing the wounds of war, but there shouldn't be a Protocol while American prisoners of war haven't been released and the amount of money needs to be approved by Congress. Therefore, the two sides would exchange notes and discuss it later. Mr. Tho agreed.

On the final day of the meeting, January 13, 1973, Kissinger suggested that the signing ceremony be conducted without speeches, with individual greetings offered outside. It was a solemn occasion in America, and even more so in Vietnam. "Therefore, we should begin with an attitude of reconciliation, generosity, and warmth towards each other," Kissinger said, and Mr. Tho agreed.

At the end of the final day of meetings, the two delegations shared a meal. Le Duc Tho raised a glass with Kissinger, saying, "This is a preliminary but very important and fundamental result for restoring peace in Vietnam." Kissinger replied, "By this time, peace will return to Indochina, for our two nations, on the day the agreement is signed."

On January 23, 1973, after initialing the Paris Agreement, Kissinger gave a pen to Le Duc Tho and said, "I'm giving you this pen to remember this historic day." Le Duc Tho returned his pen to Kissinger, saying, "You signed it, so you must keep your word."

After the Paris Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam was signed on January 27, 1973, Le Duc Tho and Kissinger were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, Mr. Tho refused to accept it, arguing that the United States had waged a war of aggression in Vietnam. He argued that one side was the aggressor, and the other was fighting against the invaders to liberate their nation; they could not share the Nobel Peace Prize. Furthermore, peace had not truly arrived in Vietnam, and the country remained divided.