Istanbul-2: When diplomacy returns to reality
The first direct contacts between Moscow and Kyiv in three years have attracted considerable international attention. This is nothing new – events related to the Ukraine negotiations, from the US President's call to the visit of the US envoy to Moscow, have often been met with excessive expectations: if not an end to the crisis, then at least a clear turning point. However, reality often contradicts this.
Nhat Lam • May 20, 2025
The first direct contacts between Moscow and Kyiv in three years have attracted considerable international attention. This is nothing new – events related to the Ukraine negotiations, from the US President's call to the visit of the US envoy to Moscow, have often been met with excessive expectations: if not an end to the crisis, then at least a clear turning point. However, reality often contradicts this.
Although it didn't bring about a breakthrough, Istanbul-2 is still considered a significant step in Russia's diplomatic process. Notably, despite opposition from Kyiv and the West, the negotiations proceeded within the framework proposed by Moscow, which many experts consider a tactical victory. This event also marks a clear shift from "media diplomacy" to "pragmatic diplomacy," reflecting a necessary change in a context of information overload and unrealistic expectations.
Three years after the failure of Istanbul-1, the approach to the Ukrainian issue has somewhat changed. Symbolic arguments, such as Ukraine abandoning its 1991 borders or joining NATO, are gradually giving way to more practical, less ideological considerations. Nevertheless, Ukrainian and European diplomats still rely heavily on the media as a strategic bargaining tool, especially in the absence of strong backing from Washington.
Kyiv and Europe aim to establish a protracted negotiation model, proposing a 30-day, renewable ceasefire and a complex security guarantee mechanism, which Russia considers unrealistic.
The strategy of "prolonging the gray zone" seems like an understandable choice for Ukraine; because, when a decisive victory is impossible, the weaker party tends to blur the lines of conflict, increase media leverage, and wait for political opportunities. A strong reaction from Moscow, if it occurs, could become a factor in putting pressure on Washington – a crucial point in Kyiv's calculations. It is no coincidence that current negotiating signals are influenced by both the direction of the Trump administration and Russia's initial proposal in Istanbul.
Istanbul-2 also reflects a worrying reality: the rise of “postmodern diplomacy,” where foreign policy statements are transformed into Twitter posts and summits are approached as social events rather than serious processes. The Ukrainian president’s declaration of willingness to meet with the Russian leader without concrete preparation, or the expectation of Trump’s appearance “if the Russian president is present,” pushed the negotiation atmosphere into a state of impracticality, superficiality, and symbolism rather than substance.
Meanwhile, the negotiating model proposed by Moscow, which was ignored at Istanbul-1, was a highly technical and practical roadmap: starting with expert groups drafting proposals, followed by high-level discussions, and finally a decision at the leadership level. This was considered a traditional form of negotiation, prioritizing substance over form, and was clearly demonstrated by the composition of the Russian delegation – a technical rather than a political performance group.
It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian side, albeit cautiously, accepted this formula. This is a positive sign, suggesting that the process may be entering a more substantive phase. However, the fragility of the process remains clear: any disruption, whether from the media or from tactical differences, could lead to mutual accusations of a lack of good faith in negotiations. Nevertheless, the clear signal is that the political space surrounding the Ukraine issue is gradually moving away from the dominance of media and strategic illusions, towards reality.
In this context, public statements or "leaked press" no longer seem to play a decisive role. Russia's position remains unchanged: the prerequisite for ending the conflict is that Ukraine withdraws its troops from the four regions annexed by Russia. This is not a new demand, but a repetition of the position announced by the Russian President in mid-2024. However, with the balance tilting in Moscow's favor both militarily and economically, Russia's maintenance and potential strengthening of this position is entirely understandable.
Harsh threats and tough bargaining are becoming signs of a pragmatic diplomacy, no longer centered on media coverage but based on assessing the concrete military, political, and economic capabilities of each side. In this context, Ukraine's – at least nominally – willingness to discuss the technical model proposed by Russia can be seen as a small step towards reality.
However, this move is not enough to demonstrate a clear strategic intention. The negotiation process remains fragile and faces at least two major risks.
The first risk is the demand for a 30-day ceasefire, which Kyiv views as a prerequisite for any progress in negotiations. Although Ukraine has temporarily set aside this demand to maintain contact with Moscow, the ceasefire remains at the core of its official position. Ukraine receives public support from European countries, and to some extent from President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly called for an immediate ceasefire, although his stance on the negotiation process has constantly shifted and shown tactical flexibility.
To date, there are no clear signs that Kyiv, Washington, or Brussels are willing to remove this condition from the agenda. This means that negotiations could break down at any time, with the media once again repeating the old story: Russia does not want to “stop the war.”
Meanwhile, Moscow's stance on the ceasefire remains largely unchanged: While a short-term halt to fighting is acceptable, a long-term ceasefire is firmly rejected without firm guarantees that Ukraine will not use the time to rearm.
For Russia, the lesson from Istanbul-1 remains relevant: After a period of "rest," Kyiv withdrew from dialogue and returned to the battlefield with renewed strength.
The second risk lies in the issue of ensuring Ukraine's security – a problem difficult to avoid if the Istanbul-2 process continues to aim for demilitarization and the establishment of a neutral Ukraine. While Kyiv has grounds for requesting security guarantees, the initial proposal – deploying European forces on Ukrainian territory – is unacceptable to Moscow. Such a structure would not only raise military concerns but also pave the way for indirect Western influence in negotiations.
The question is whether the two sides can find a compromise. If not, Istanbul-2 will fail like its predecessor. The summer military campaign will then be a period of readjusting the balance of power, and by autumn, the parties can return to the negotiating table in a new context. Because, as history has shown, every war ends in peace.
Nevertheless, the cycle of history seems to repeat itself: the parties are meeting again in Istanbul, just like three years ago. The international community can only hope that, this time, the accumulation of numbers, initiatives, signals, and exchanges will be enough to bring about a qualitative shift: a substantive peace agreement, not a repeated scenario of delay.
