Istanbul-2: When diplomacy returns to reality
The first direct contacts between Moscow and Kiev in three years have attracted great international attention. This is not new - events related to the negotiations on Ukraine, from the US President's call to the US special envoy's visit to Moscow, are often fraught with excessive expectations: if not an end to the crisis, then at least a clear turning point. However, the reality is often the opposite.
Nhat Lam • May 20, 2025
The first direct contacts between Moscow and Kiev in three years have attracted great international attention. This is not new - events related to the negotiations on Ukraine, from the US President's call to the US special envoy's visit to Moscow, are often fraught with excessive expectations: if not an end to the crisis, then at least a clear turning point. However, the reality is often the opposite.
Although it did not bring about a breakthrough, Istanbul-2 is still considered an important step forward in Russia's diplomatic process. It is worth noting that despite the opposition from Kiev and the West, the negotiations took place within the framework proposed by Moscow, which many experts consider a tactical victory. The event also marked a clear shift from "media diplomacy" to "pragmatic diplomacy", reflecting a necessary change in the context of information saturation and unrealistic expectations.
Three years after the failure of Istanbul-1, the approach to Ukraine has changed somewhat. Symbolic arguments, such as Ukraine abandoning the 1991 borders or joining NATO, are giving way to more practical, less ideological considerations. Nevertheless, Ukrainian and European diplomats still rely heavily on the media as a strategic bargaining tool, especially in the absence of strong backing from Washington.
The goal of Kiev and Europe is to form a long-term negotiating model, with proposals for a 30-day renewable ceasefire and a complex security guarantee mechanism, which in Russia's view is unrealistic.
The strategy of “prolonging the gray zone” seems to be an understandable choice for Ukraine; because, when a decisive victory is not possible, the weaker side tends to blur the lines of conflict, increase media leverage and wait for political opportunities. A strong reaction from Moscow, if it occurs, could become a factor to put pressure on Washington - a key point in Kiev's calculations. It is no coincidence that the current negotiation signals are influenced by the direction of the Trump administration and are based on Russia's initial proposal in Istanbul.
Istanbul-2 also reflects a worrying reality: the rise of “postmodern diplomacy,” where foreign policy statements are reduced to tweets and summits are approached more as social events than as serious processes. The Ukrainian president’s declaration of readiness to meet the Russian leader without any specific preparation, or the expectation that Mr. Trump would show up “if the Russian president is present,” has pushed the negotiating atmosphere into a state of unrealistic, superficiality, more symbolic than substantive.
Meanwhile, the negotiating model proposed by Moscow, which was ignored at Istanbul-1, is a highly technical and pragmatic route: starting with expert groups drafting a draft, followed by high-level discussions, and finally a decision at the leadership level. This is considered a traditional form of negotiation, prioritizing substance over form, and is clearly demonstrated by the composition of the Russian delegation - a technical group, not a political show.
It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian side, albeit cautiously, has accepted this formula. This is a positive sign, suggesting that the process may be entering a more substantive phase. However, the fragility of the process remains clear: any disruption, whether from the media or from tactical differences, could lead to mutual accusations of a lack of willingness to negotiate. Nevertheless, the clear signal is that the political space around the Ukrainian issue is gradually moving away from the domination of media and strategic illusions and closer to reality.
In this context, public statements or “press leaks” no longer seem to play a decisive role. Russia’s position remains unchanged: the prerequisite for ending the conflict is that Ukraine withdraw its troops from the four regions annexed by Russia. This is not a new demand, but a reiteration of the position that the Russian president announced in mid-2024. However, with the balance tilted in Moscow’s favor both militarily and economically, it is completely understandable that Russia maintains and possibly strengthens this position.
Threats and tough bargaining are becoming the hallmarks of a pragmatic diplomacy that no longer revolves around the media but rather on the assessment of the parties’ specific military, political and economic capabilities. In this context, Ukraine’s – at least nominal – willingness to negotiate according to the technical model proposed by Russia can be seen as a small step towards reality.
However, this move is not enough to demonstrate clear strategic intentions. The negotiation process remains fragile, and faces at least two major risks.
The first risk is the demand for a 30-day ceasefire, which Kiev sees as a prerequisite for any progress in negotiations. Although Ukraine has temporarily shelved this demand to maintain contact with Moscow, the ceasefire remains the core of its official position. Ukraine has received public support from European countries, and to some extent from President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly called for an immediate ceasefire, although his stance on the negotiations has been fluid and tactically flexible.
As of now, there is no clear sign that Kiev, Washington or Brussels are ready to remove this condition from the agenda, which means that at any moment, the negotiations could collapse amid the media returning to the old story: Russia does not want to “stop the war”.
Meanwhile, Moscow's stance on the ceasefire has remained largely unchanged: It is willing to accept a short-term pause in fighting, but firmly rejects a long-term ceasefire without solid guarantees that Ukraine will not use that time to rearm.
For Russia, the lesson from Istanbul-1 still holds true: After a “rest”, Kiev withdrew from the dialogue and returned to the battlefield with new strength.
The second risk is the issue of Ukraine’s security, which is difficult to avoid if the Istanbul-2 process remains aimed at demilitarizing and shaping a neutral Ukraine. While Kiev has a reason to demand security guarantees, the initial proposal – the deployment of European forces on Ukrainian territory – is unacceptable to Moscow. Such a structure not only raises military concerns, but also opens the way for indirect Western influence at the negotiating table.
The question is whether the two sides can find a compromise formula. If not, Istanbul-2 will fail like its predecessor. Then, the summer military campaign will be a period of readjustment of the balance of power, and by the fall, the sides can return to the negotiating table in a new context. Because as history has shown, all wars end in peace.
Nevertheless, the cycle of history seems to be repeating itself: the parties are meeting again in Istanbul, just as they did three years ago. The international community can only hope that this time, the accumulation of numbers, initiatives, signals and exchanges will be enough to produce a qualitative change: a real peace agreement, not a repeat of the scenario of postponement.
