'Exposing' the weaknesses of China's strategic nuclear submarines

Limitations in weapons, technology and combat experience make it difficult for Chinese strategic nuclear submarines to deploy nuclear retaliation capabilities.

China's Type 094 Jin-class strategic nuclear submarine. Photo: RT.

To carry out nuclear retaliation, each country must ensure that a part of its nuclear force can survive a first strike by the enemy.Thanks to their ability to hide secretly in the ocean, strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) carrying ballistic missiles, including the Type 094 Jin-class submarine,is seen by China as a key component of its retaliatory capabilities, according to the National Interest.

However, a recent report by the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) said that dAlthough the Jin-class nuclear submarines can be seen as a major step forward in Beijing's efforts to develop nuclear deterrence, these "nascent" SSBN models still have huge weaknesses.

According to experts Bonnie Glaser and Mathew Funaiole at the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) under the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the first weakness of the Type 094 submarine is the combat capability of the nuclear-tipped missiles installed on the ship.

The Type 094's JL-2 intercontinental ballistic missile (SLBM) can carry one to three nuclear warheads, but has a relatively short range, estimated at about 7,400 km.

To attack the US mainland with the JL-2, Chinese submarines are forced to pass through a number of checkpoints to enter the Pacific Ocean, while the Type 094's stealth technology is not highly appreciated and is easily detected by anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems.

In addition, the Type 094 still has some basic design flaws such as the large-volume missile bay at the rear and the water discharge door integrated into the compartment that is easily detected by the sonar system.

BA 2009 ONI report found that the Type 094 was noisier than Russia’s Delta III-class submarines from the 1970s, making it vulnerable to modern sonar systems used by the US and its allies. Meanwhile, the JL-2 missile it carries has repeatedly failed test launches, and as of 2013 it was unclear whether China had successfully test-launched this missile.

Even if technical improvements help the Type-094 avoid tracking by advanced anti-submarine equipment, the US missile defense system (BMD) will likely be able to intercept most JL-2 missiles launched from viable locations such as the sea, according to Christian Conroy, an expert on nuclear weapons and East Asia security.Bohai Sea and the East Sea.

When a Jin-class submarine launches a JL-2 missile, Aegis defense radar systems deployed near China's coast will immediately detect and activate SM-3 interceptors within 5 seconds. In addition to deploying additional SM-3 interceptors offshore and Ground Base Interceptors (GBIs) in California and Alaska, the Pentagon plans to deploy the SM-3 Block IIA system that can intercept any Chinese missile capable of reaching the United States.

The third weakness is that the Chinese navy is showing a lack of experience.in maintaining deterrence patrols in the oceans. Beijing has traditionally relied solely on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles to demonstrate deterrence, so Beijing's Type 094 submarine commanders have not received much training in missile control and launch in the event of crisis and conflict.

The final weakness is that Beijing is facing technical hurdles in establishing a command and control (C2) system for its ballistic missile submarines.

C2 is a modern communication system between senior leaders on the mainland and submarine firing protocols to ensure missile launches are only carried out when absolutely necessary,in case a nuclear submarine loses contact with the center.

Salty seawater means radio waves can only travel short distances underwater, forcing communication stations to use very low frequency (VLF) or extremely low frequency (ELF) radio waves to send signals to submarines.

Taking advantage of illegal artificial islands in the East Sea

According to expert Glaser,China will certainly seek to improve the infrastructure on its illegally built artificial islands in the South China Sea to ensure the safety and enhance the ability of its nuclear submarines to deploy into the Pacific Ocean. Control of the South China Sea could help China overcome the limitations of its current submarine base on Hainan Island, because submarines operating far from this base are easily detected by US anti-submarine systems.

Besides, vThe illegal deployment of HQ-9 surface-to-air missile batteries on Woody Island (and possibly other islands) with a range of 201 km will help China enhance its ability to counter foreign anti-submarine aircraft in the event of a crisis.

China's anti-submarine forces could also play an important role.Establishing new air bases on illegally built artificial islands for anti-submarine aircraft could potentially help Beijing counter enemy attack submarines that are closely tracking China's SSBN fleet.These efforts could offset weaknesses and strengthen China's retaliatory capabilities.

There is little public information about the development of new missile and submarine technology, and it is unclear when China will be able to fully address these issues. However, ensuring safe passage in the South China Sea is only a temporary solution, according to Glaser.

"China's nuclear ballistic missile submarines still have to operate far from their base on Hainan Island, passing through strategic control points to locations that are far away and not as safe as those near shore, a task that is too difficult for China's current Jin-class nuclear submarine fleet," Ms. Glaser emphasized.

According to VNE