Should Russia be worried about the AUKUS alliance?

US President Joe Biden speaks about the AUKUS security initiative on September 15 at the White House. Photo: CNN

The formation of a new trilateral military and political alliance between the US, Australia, and the UK (AUKUS), and the resulting collapse of France's "contract of the century" to build a new generation of diesel-powered submarines for Australia, has provoked mixed reactions in Russia.

Some people expressed satisfaction at the conflict that arose between the US and France, while others voiced concern that this alliance was targeting Moscow just as much as it was targeting Beijing. Still others worried about the implications of the US decision to share nuclear submarine technology with a non-nuclear nation (instead of French diesel submarines, Canberra would now have eight nuclear submarines).

These are all valid points, but they all focus on the short-term consequences of forming AUKUS. However, the decision to form a trilateral alliance and the new approach to modernizing Australia's submarine fleet also have long-term implications, including for Russia.

Above all, the creation of AUKUS confirms that the impasse with China is clearly the number one priority in the foreign policy of US President Joe Biden and his administration. Defending against China is clearly worth the risk of serious disagreements with Paris, worth putting Canberra in an awkward position, and worth broadening the interpretation of nuclear non-proliferation. The reality is that Washington is increasingly unable to compete with Beijing alone in the naval arena, especially in the Eastern Pacific, so it has no choice but to rely on its most reliable partners, while ignoring the unavoidable costs.

Nuclear-powered submarines have only one undeniable advantage over modern diesel submarines: a greater operational range, thanks to their superior autonomy. If the new submarines are solely intended for Australia's defense, nuclear power is not necessary. However, if they are expected to conduct covert operations for months in more distant waters – such as in the Taiwan Strait, near the Korean Peninsula, or somewhere in the Arabian Sea – then a nuclear reactor would be a significant advantage.

Illustration photo: Getty

For Russia, this means that any action they take from now on will be scrutinized by Washington in the context of the US-China confrontation. For example, the White House will turn a blind eye to Moscow's cooperation with countries like India in the field of military technology, viewing it as a way to improve its regional counterweight to Beijing. On the other hand, Russia's current support for China's naval modernization program will be closely examined and could become grounds for the US to impose new sanctions on both countries.

Some speculate that, over time, AUKUS will become an alliance in Asia equivalent to NATO, with more countries joining, such as Canada, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, India, etc. These predictions, of course, have sparked concern in Russia.

However, these are unlikely to materialize. Countries like South Korea and India have no desire to join a multilateral military alliance that could damage their relations with other nations. In any case, the mere creation of a new structure would be an indirect acknowledgment by Washington that the rigid alliance model of the 20th century is unsuitable for this century. If it does materialize, AUKUS would be an attempt to find a more modern alternative to NATO.

NATO's role in U.S. strategy will undoubtedly diminish, but this is not necessarily beneficial for Russia in the long term if it means the organization will be replaced by structures such as AUKUS. NATO has detailed and clear decision-making procedures and mechanisms for reaching compromises among its broad membership. NATO's decisions may not be pleasant to Moscow, but they are generally consistent and predictable. The same cannot be said for "lighter" structures such as AUKUS, where spontaneous responses are possible, which would certainly multiply political risks.

The AUKUS concept predicts that control of sea lanes will continue to be a priority for the United States. The U.S. is unable to establish sufficient control over land transport corridors in Eurasia, nor does it need to: the primary global freight routes in the near future will be sea lanes. For this reason, it is not the Eurasian continent but the world's oceans that will become the main battleground between the U.S. and China.

For Russia, primarily a land power, this is generally acceptable – as long as Moscow doesn't try to position itself at the center of the Sino-American standoff. In theory, within the next few decades, Australian submarines could appear off the coasts of Russia's Sakhalin and Kamchatka Peninsula, or even through the Bering Strait into the Arctic Ocean, posing a new potential threat to Russia's Northern Fleet. However, there are reasons to believe that their main routes will lie further south, and will not directly impact Russian interests.

China has also just submitted an application to join the TPP. Photo: Diplomat

Notably, around the time of the establishment of AUKUS, China had also applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP was essentially conceived as part of a strategy to contain the Chinese economy under former US President Barack Obama, but his successor, Donald Trump, refused to join the initiative. China's chances of joining the CPTPP are very slim, as in making the offer, Beijing once again demonstrated that, for its part, it wants to limit competition with Washington to trade, investment, and technology. On the other hand, by creating AUKUS, the US and its partners are increasingly signaling a plan to expand confrontation into the areas of military technology and the geopolitical arena.

In May 1882, when Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy agreed to form a military and political bloc called the Tripartite Alliance, few in Europe foresaw the long-term consequences. Ultimately, the alliance's purpose was purely to contain France, whose vengeful ambitions were rampant following its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1872. At the time, there were no better plans in Berlin, Vienna, or Rome. But just over 30 years later, Europe was engulfed in the blood of an unprecedented war.

Today, AUKUS appears to be a rickety, unstable structure hastily assembled. But in 20 or 30 years, the logic that led its members to form a new military and political alliance could lead them into a situation from which neither they nor their adversaries can escape without suffering the most severe consequences for themselves and the rest of the world. That is the main long-term danger from AUKUS.