The Party's strategic direction in the Mau Than general offensive and uprising

Politburo meeting in December 1967. Photo: Archive

The 1968 Mau Than General Offensive and Uprising of the army and people of the South, under the leadership of the Party, was a turning point in the resistance war against the US, to save the country because of its strategic impact on the direction towards ending the war as planned by our Party, headed by President Ho Chi Minh. This was the event that started an irreversible process: the US withdrew, the puppet regime collapsed, the South was completely liberated, the country was unified.

The Party decided to launch the General Offensive and Uprising right on the occasion of Tet Mau Than 1968 for the following reasons:

One is,The revolutionary war of our army and people in the South has had strong developments in both position and force.This is shown in the following points:

Until the end of 1967, that is, nearly 3 years after the US combat troops poured into the South with superior means and firepower, an overwhelming force of nearly half a million troops, not to mention more than 50,000 US Allied troops and more than half a million Saigon troops, but the US still could not turn around the passive strategic situation, could not force the Liberation Army to fight the US way after two strategic counterattacks in the two dry seasons of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967. An interesting and very meaningful statistic was written by American war correspondent Neil Sheehand in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book "Glamorous Deception - John Paul and America in Vietnam" (The brightning lie - John Paul Vann and The America in Vietnam), that of the 400 clashes recorded between 1965 and 1967, two-thirds of them were in which the Viet Cong fired first. This clearly demonstrated that the initiative on the battlefield belonged to the revolutionary forces, even though the US named its strategic plan asSearch and Destroymain force of the Liberation Army.

On the other hand, the US had to change its war strategy, from the strategy ofspecial warmove to strategylocal war, with the US army playing the main role on the southern battlefield, directly clashing with the liberation armed forces, while the Saigon army only played a support and pacification role.

The US government also decided to expand the war space, creating an excuse to escalate bombing and attack the North by air force and navy to destroy the economic and military potential of the large rear, while at the same time preventing and cutting off the North's support for the South.

However, the US failed to achieve its set goals, failed to destroy the main force of the Liberation Army, failed to prevent the increasing movement of forces, materials, and combat vehicles from the North to the South. On the contrary, the US suffered great losses in soldiers' lives and aircraft. The US forces, weapons, and firepower were now dispersed in both regions, unable to concentrate entirely on the main battlefield in the South.

By the end of 1967, the armed forces of the liberation of the South were still standing firm and developing, with few losses. The total number of troops had reached more than 270,000. The liberated areas and revolutionary bases continued to be consolidated and expanded. All of the above allowed the concentration of the majority of forces to launch a strategic attack in the largest, most unexpected space, on a scale throughout the South.

Second, the Party had a sober and objective assessment, clearly recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of the US and the Saigon government as well as the international context at that time.

When the US massively sent hundreds of thousands of troops into the South with the intention of using overwhelming numbers of troops, firepower, and weapons to destroy the revolutionary armed forces of the South in a short time, our Party calmly and soberly assessed and judged the situation, believing that: The direct participation of US troops in the war would make our people's revolutionary war more difficult and fiercer. But the US entered the context of a special war strategy that was in danger of being completely bankrupt and aimed at rescuing the Saigon government and army that the US had painstakingly built up over the past 10 years from the danger of collapse. The US was in a losing and passive position, so the comparison of forces on the battlefield basically did not change much. Our Party and the army and people of the whole country were still determined to fight the US and defeat the US.

Some brotherly and friendly countries have advised us not to confront the US army because it is the strongest army in the world, never defeated, Vietnam should negotiate to get the most favorable terms possible. Our Party and State listen to that advice but clearly demonstrate independence in perception, thinking, policies and actions. The Party believes that we must first directly confront the US combat troops to know how strong and weak the US army is, what its strengths and weaknesses are. If we are determined to fight the US, we will find a suitable and effective way to fight.

In fact, just over two months after the first two battalions of US Marines landed in Da Nang (March 8, 1965), the armed forces of Zone V proactively attacked and completely destroyed a US company camping in Nui Thanh, Quang Nam on May 26, 1965.

That first victory over the US greatly encouraged and boosted the fighting spirit of the Liberation Army, creating a solid foundation for the assessment.can beat America. The next clash occurred in Van Tuong, Quang Ngai when a regimental unit of the Liberation Army was surrounded on all four sides by American troops with superior weapons and equipment, aiming to destroy them on August 18, 1965. Despite being at a disadvantage, this Liberation Army unit fought tenaciously, repelled many attacks by American troops, and withdrew from the area with few casualties.

After the battle of Van Tuong, the Party had more basis to affirmcan beat America. Coming to the Plei Me Campaign, which was actively launched by the Liberation Army from late October to late November 1965, causing serious losses to American combat troops, our Party affirmed thatfully capable of defeating the US army.

Thus, through the reality of directly confronting the US army, the leaders and people of the South initially understood the strengths and weaknesses, strengths and weaknesses of the enemy to determine appropriate and effective ways of fighting, determined to launch a decisive military strike to turn the tide of the war and maintain the initiative on the battlefield.

By the end of 1967, the US government was in a strategic dilemma, after trying to concentrate on launching two strategic counter-attacks in the dry seasons of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 without achieving the set goals, whether to launch a third counter-attack or not, whether to continue sending more than 206,000 US troops as proposed by Commander-in-Chief Westmoreland or not... Grasping that "dilemma" of the US, our Party chose the right time to decide to launch a general offensive and uprising in the most unexpected way, attacking directly at the strongest and toughest targets of the enemy, which were cities, towns, military bases, warehouses, airports, ports...

This largest-scale general offensive and uprising was intended to demonstrate to the US that the Liberation Army of South Vietnam still had enough strength to simultaneously attack the strongest areas of the US and the Saigon government and army; that even if the US continued to counterattack or continued to send more troops to the South, the situation on the battlefield would not change as the US wished.

This was the Party's decisive psychological blow and achieved its goal of forcing the US government to admit the fact that it could not defeat the people and army of the South by military force.

The will of the US to continue the war with high intensity was seriously shaken. This clearly demonstrated the Party's policy of not destroying large-scale US troops (in reality, it was very difficult to completely destroy US units), but to concentrate forces to fight so that the US troops would always be passive in response, had to fight in our own way, and had to consider other solutions to end the war.

The international context at that time was also quite favorable for the fight of our army and people. The Soviet Union and China both agreed that they must help and provide much aid to Vietnam in fighting the US to protect the outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia. Besides, our people's just resistance against the invaders received the sympathy and support of peace-loving, democratic and justice-loving forces in the world. That also created more basis for the Party to decide to launch the General Offensive and Uprising in 1968.

The US Embassy in Saigon was attacked on the night of January 30 and early morning of January 31, 1968. On February 1, 1968, the image of the US Embassy being attacked was published on the front page of the New York Times, shocking the entire United States. International archive photo/VNA distribution. Archive photo

Creativity in strategic leadership

Third, our Party has creatively applied and promoted urban combat experience from the resistance war against French colonialists.

During the resistance war against the French (1945-1954), our army and people accumulated a lot of combat experience in Saigon (starting from September 23, 1945); in Nha Trang (from October 19, 1945); in Hai Phong, Lang Son town (from November 20, 1946); to the simultaneous shooting in Hanoi and cities north of the 16th parallel that opened the nationwide resistance war (from December 19, 1946)... Therefore, the General Offensive and Uprising in 1968 was the continuation of the experience of combat in the city in a new context, with a new target of combat, the army and people of the South had grown in strength, fought from the outside and were completely proactive in the timing and targets of attack.

The idea of ​​launching a general offensive with the main goal of targeting urban areas to gain victory was thought of by the Party from late 1964 to early 1965, when the US special war strategy was at risk of bankruptcy because the three pillars of this strategy could not be implemented.

That was the instability and disintegration of the Saigon government due to constant conflicts and coups; due to the impact of the movement for people's rights and democracy of the people in the South in both rural and urban areas. That was the ineffectiveness in operations and organization, and force building of the Saigon army. That was the failure and bankruptcy of the strategic hamlet national policy to pacify the rural areas of the South. However, because the US combat troops were rushed to the South in large numbers, the opportunity to launch a general offensive was no longer favorable and the conditions for victory were also affected.

Fourth, 1968 was the year of the US presidential election, becoming a sensitive year in US politics. If our army and people fought hard and won resoundingly, it would have a huge impact.

Our Party has examined the internal situation of the United States and believes that if President Johnson wants to be re-elected for a second term, he must resolve the issue of the Vietnam War in a way that the United States must demonstrate in practice a clear victory in this costly and costly war. Therefore, the Party decided to launch a General Offensive and Uprising to force the US government to clearly demonstrate its policy and make a decisive decision on the war in Vietnam. Because this is a very important issue that the majority of American people and voters are concerned about, especially when there are nearly half a million American troops in Vietnam along with a huge amount of weapons and money, but after nearly 3 years, the situation is still not bright, causing the wave of opposition to the war in the United States to rise higher and higher.

The results of the general offensive and uprising clearly demonstrated our Party's calculations. On March 31, 1968, exactly two months after the night of the general offensive, President Johnson had to appear on television to announce three of the most important decisions of the war and of his political career: One was to limit the bombing of the North from the 20th parallel northward (by October 31, 1968, the bombing of the entire North would be stopped); two was to propose that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam negotiate unconditionally to find a solution to end the war; three was to decide not to run for a second presidential term due to disappointment with the way the war was run and the results of the war that lost the people's hearts, cost lives, and was fiercely opposed throughout the United States.

The above decisions showed that President Johnson had admitted defeat. And that admission of defeat by the head of the United States further demonstrated the art of war leadership and the wise and bold decision to launch the General Offensive and Uprising of our Party, opening up a practical opportunity: Fight to make the US withdraw, fight to make the puppet government fall.

Associate Professor, Dr. Nguyen Manh Ha

Former Director of the Institute of Party History, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics