Illustrative image

Strategic handshakes

Undeniably, Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to see things through in Ukraine, regardless of the consequences, makes "getting closer to China" even more urgent. China needs energy for its growing economy; Russia has abundant energy supplies. Russia needs financing to revive its declining economy; China has capital.

In May 2014, the two countries signed a 30-year agreement to export Russian gas to China via a pipeline through Siberia. Chinese media and leaders offered strong official support for Russia; Premier Li Keqiang visited Moscow, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged to “provide necessary assistance to the best of our ability”… According to Li Jianmin, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), “saving Russia is also saving ourselves.”

China and Russia conducted joint naval exercises in the East China Sea. Following the gas contract, other agreements quickly followed, ranging from cultural exchanges and the inauguration of a new postal service to information exchange between the two news agencies, cooperation between Russia's anti-drug agency, FSKN, and Chinese authorities to prevent the trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan and synthetic drugs from China into Russia; plans for a high-speed rail link between the two countries; and joint development plans for the Zarubino port, an ice-free port on the Sea of ​​Japan, which would give China's mainland Jilin province access to Russian and North Korean trade routes.

Receiving more attention from the West are scientific cooperation agreements related to the military. Plans have been discussed regarding cooperation in space exploration, navigation and satellite technology, and, most surprisingly, the sale of Russia's advanced Su-35 fighter jets.

China needs Russian energy for its growing economy. (Illustrative image)

Russia's concerns

Beneath its seemingly friendly exterior, Russia's concerns about China are immediately apparent. China's plans for a Belt and Road Initiative through Central Asia are irritating to Russia, as Russian officials argue that the region, comprising countries formerly part of the Soviet Union, is within its natural sphere of influence, not China's.

The Arctic is no different. China, unlike Russia, is not a neighboring country. However, it has been granted observer status in the Arctic Council, and Chinese-owned companies have expressed interest in acquiring real estate there.

A land concession can also be controversial. Concerned about the vast areas of uncultivated land in Russia's Far East, Putin proposed giving each resident one hectare of land free of charge, provided they and Russian citizens have a 10-year plan for the land and a certificate from a bank.

Moscow has long been concerned about Chinese migration into the region, home to a dwindling Russian population, now estimated at around 6 million. Just across the border are 120 million Chinese, many of whom are drawn to the area.

Commenting on this, the Moscow Times stated that the pivot towards China was "hasty and based on conditions that have not been properly revealed and assessed." Russia also recognizes that, at the very moment Russia no longer wants to be a refueling station for China, China will also seek other diversified energy sources.

China was also not very happy.

On the Chinese side, despite government censorship of the media, there is also considerable evidence of discontent. According to CASS researcher Wen Yi, Chinese public opinion has repeatedly debated whether China should rescue Russia.

Wen argues that Russia doesn't genuinely consider China a "reliable" partner. This is evident in Putin's "New Eastern Policy," which has expanded beyond China to include a Eurasian alliance that encompasses former Soviet republics, as well as strategic relationships with countries opposed to China, such as Vietnam and India.

Wen then posed a series of questions: Should we import large quantities of oil and gas to help Russia? Would Russia be pleased that we are buying oil and gas at such low prices? Could China help Russia counter sanctions? If so, what benefit would China receive? And in return, would China receive anything "genuine" from Russia? Since Putin has emphasized that agreements must ensure Russia's interests, should we consider China's best interests? He concluded that China cannot and should not try to save Russia: only Russia can save itself.

Feng Yujun, a Russia expert at the China Institute of Contemporary Relations (CICIR), a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of State Security, argues that China should not interfere in the disputes of other countries but should focus on domestic development. Echoing Wen Yi's sentiment, Feng concludes that only Russia can save itself.

An unsigned editorial in the English-language edition of the Global Times expressed similar sentiments: however generous, Chinese aid could only be of limited use if the Russian economy continued to rely heavily on oil exports while neglecting structural diversification. Furthermore, Russia would suspect that Chinese aid was driven by ulterior motives: "China"—perhaps the author's shorthand for "the Chinese government"—must understand that Russia does not want to become dependent on the Chinese economy. The author advises Beijing to act as an active mediator between Russia and the US to prevent the conflict from spiraling out of control.

Beijing is also aware that, in addition to selling weapons to China, Russia has also sold a significant amount of weapons to two countries with which China has strained relations: Vietnam and India. Recently, Vietnam acquired three Kilo-class attack submarines, with three more scheduled for delivery in 2016. Hanoi's motivation for purchasing these submarines is to patrol the area around the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. Russia also sells weapons to India; the crew of India's first domestically produced nuclear submarine, the Arihant, which began sea trials in December 2014, received training from Russian specialists, and Russian scientists assisted in adjusting the size of its reactor. The Indian Navy also operates a nuclear submarine leased from Russia.

Furthermore, Russia and China have recently clashed over the establishment of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Bank, with Russia opposing China's plans to dominate the bank despite China being a major contributor.

China's proposal called for a charter capital of $10 billion, with shares divided among participating members in proportion to their GDP. Because China's economy is larger than all the other members—the four Central Asian countries plus Russia—this would give China significant leverage. Russian negotiators accused Beijing of offering the Central Asian countries not only bilateral credits but also a separate financial mechanism that could operate without Russia.

China wants the bank to be headquartered in Beijing, while Russia argues in favor of Almaty, home to the Eurasian Development Bank, which includes all members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) except China. Another factor is that the SCO bank is expected to boost China's Belt and Road Initiative, a project that Russia is wary of.

In another warning sign, despite Russian media reports claiming China would use Russia's GLONASS global positioning system in two northwestern Chinese cities, Beijing proudly announced that the People's Liberation Army was testing its independently developed Beidou system. Clearly, China has no intention of becoming dependent on Russian technology.

Currently, Russia and China share common motives in opposing the US and Europe. However, each side recognizes that the other may have exceeded the limits of European-American tolerance. Russia does this through its shifting allegiance toward the West, and China through its lawless actions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

In both countries, there is a fear that one nation will be drawn into the other's conflict. Beneath the discourse of solidarity, there is little trust between them.

According to Infonet