How did the Taliban gain territory so quickly?

It is clear that the rebels always have the upper hand, while the government struggles to maintain control.

This week, a leaked US intelligence report suggested that Kabul could be attacked within weeks, and the government could collapse within 90 days.

So how did the Taliban win so quickly?

According to the BBC, for much of the past 20 years, the US and its NATO allies have spent much of their time training and equipping Afghan security forces. Many US and British generals have claimed to have created a strong and capable Afghan army.

But, those claims today seem like empty words.

The Power of the Taliban

In theory, the Afghan government still holds the advantage with a larger force. The security force is at least 300,000 strong, at least on paper. That includes the army, air force and police.

But in reality, the South Asian nation has consistently struggled to meet its recruitment targets.

The Afghan army and police have a reputation for high casualties, desertion and corruption - with some commanders receiving monthly salaries from soldiers who do not actually exist - known as "ghost soldiers".

In its latest report to the US Congress, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) expressed "serious concerns about the corrosive impact of corruption... and the questionable accuracy of data on the actual strength of these forces".

Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute said that even the Afghan army has never been sure how many troops it really has.

There are also issues of equipment and morale. Soldiers are often deployed to areas to which they have no family or tribal ties. That is why some may be so quick to abandon their posts without fighting the Taliban.

Meanwhile, it is increasingly difficult to quantify the Taliban's strength.

According to the US Counterterrorism Center at West Point, estimates indicate that the force includes 60,000 core fighters. Combined with support groups and other insurgent wings, the number could exceed 200,000.

Dr Mike Martin, a former British army officer who speaks Pashto, has warned of the dangers of identifying the Taliban as a single group. He describes the Taliban as “moving closer to a loosely and perhaps temporarily linked coalition of independent elites”.

The Afghan government is also riven by local factional motives, the doctor said. Afghan history shows that families, tribes and even government officials often switch sides, mainly to ensure their own survival.

Access to weapons

The Afghan government should have the advantage in both funding and weapons. It has received billions of dollars to pay and equip its troops—mostly from the United States. In a July 2021 report, SIGAR noted that more than $88 billion has been spent on Afghanistan’s security. But SIGAR said: “Whether that money is well spent will ultimately be determined by the outcome of the war on the ground.”

And, while the Afghan Air Force should have secured a significant advantage on the battlefield, it has consistently struggled to maintain and operate its 211 aircraft (a problem exacerbated by the Taliban’s deliberate targeting of pilots), and it has been unable to respond to requests from commanders on the ground.

That’s why the US Air Force has recently been forced to take part in the skies over cities like Lashkar Gah, which are under attack by the Taliban. But it’s unclear how long Washington is willing to provide that support.

The Taliban often rely on revenue from the drug trade, but they also receive outside support.

The Taliban have recently captured a variety of weapons and equipment from Afghan security forces, some of which were provided by the United States, including Humvees, night vision goggles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery. In addition to the lethality of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), their local knowledge and understanding of the terrain give them an advantage.

Focus on the North and West

Some experts have seen evidence of a coordinated plan in the Taliban's recent advances.

Ben Barry – a British Army brigadier general and now a senior fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies – said the Taliban’s performance could be opportunistic. But he admitted: “If you were to write a campaign plan, I’d be hard-pressed to think of anything better than this.”

The general pointed out that the focus of Taliban attacks was in the north and west, rather than in traditional strongholds in the south, and gradually captured a series of provinces.

The Taliban have also seized key border checkpoints and border crossings, siphoning customs revenues from the cash-strapped government. They have also stepped up targeted killings of officials, activists and journalists.

Slowly, but surely, the Taliban have erased the small gains the government has made over the past 20 years.

As for Kabul's strategy, it is even harder to define.

Pledges to retake territory held by the Taliban appear increasingly futile.

Mr Barry said the government appeared to have a plan to hold the larger cities. Afghan commandos had been deployed to prevent Lashkar Gah in Helmand from falling.

But how long will it last?

The Afghan special forces are relatively small, about 10,000 strong, and they are stretched to the limit.

The Taliban also appears to be winning propaganda, boosting morale on the battlefield and creating a sense of unity. By contrast, the Afghan government is in dire straits but divided and is steadily firing generals.

What is the outcome?

On the Afghan government side, the situation is bleak. However, according to Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, "the situation can still be salvaged politically." He believes that if the government can win over tribal leaders, there is still a chance.

The summer fighting will soon end as the Afghan winter sets in – making it harder to deploy ground forces. There will likely still be a stalemate later this year, with the government trying to hold Kabul and larger cities. The situation could even change if the Taliban fractures.

But now it seems that the efforts of the US and NATO to bring peace, security and stability to Afghanistan have become futile.