President Ho Chi Minh directed revolutionary strategy in the Dien Bien Phu campaign.

After the Border Campaign (late 1950), the Vietnam People's Army won many campaigns to gain and maintain the initiative on the Northern battlefield. The French army fell into increasingly dire straits.

To salvage the situation, in May 1953, with the agreement of the United States, the French Government appointed General Nava, Chief of the General Staff of the North Atlantic Army, as Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Force in Indochina.

In early July 1953, Nava outlined a comprehensive, systematic military plan, which divided the combat plan into two steps: The first step in the winter of 1953 and spring of 1954, maintained a strategic defensive position at 18 degrees north latitude and beyond; attacked and pacified the South and Central Indochina; eliminated the free zone of Inter-Zone V. The second step: If the first step was achieved, we would move on to a strategic attack on the North, gain great military victory, and force us to negotiate under conditions favorable to them.

After getting bogged down in the battlefields of 1953, France decided to build the Dien Bien Phu stronghold, a solid fortress that our troops could not destroy. The West considered this a strategic shift by General Nava.

Meanwhile, learning about the battlefield situation, in early 1954, when chairing a Politburo meeting, President Ho Chi Minh appointed the leadership and command of the campaign, mobilized forces to the Northwest and assigned General Vo Nguyen Giap as Commander-in-Chief. Our determination was: "Destroy the Dien Bien Phu stronghold to create a new turning point in the war".

Dien Bien Phu was chosen by both us and the enemy as the key battle to end the war. When handing over the task to General Vo Nguyen Giap, President Ho Chi Minh said: “I give you full authority to decide. This battle is important, we must fight to win. Only fight if we are sure of victory, if we cannot win, we will not fight.”

This was a strategic direction, of great significance in determining the success of the Dien Bien Phu campaign in 1954. It was thanks to the strategic direction of President Ho Chi Minh that General Vo Nguyen Giap made changes in the combat strategy, bringing resounding victory to our army and people.

In the Dien Bien Phu campaign of 1954, for the first time, an Asian colony destroyed and captured more than 160,000 foreign legionnaires of a Western imperialist country in a decisive strategic battle. That victory"make the world amazed and admired".

That victory first of all stemmed from the correct resistance line outlined by our Party and President Ho Chi Minh.

With a long-term and proactive vision, right from the establishment of the Vietnam Propaganda Liberation Army, President Ho Chi Minh clearly stated: "The resistance war against the French is a people's resistance war, so we must mobilize and arm the people." Our army and people have built a widespread people's war posture with the spirit of "each citizen is a soldier, each of our Party cells is a staff organization."

Our people's war strategy made the French army large but small. They wanted to concentrate their forces to launch a major campaign/attack, but had to disperse their forces to defend and respond. The enemy wanted to take the initiative, attack or rescue their comrades, but was held back by the local resistance forces and guerrilla warfare.

The 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign and the Dien Bien Phu Campaign were typical examples of the dangerous situation created by people's war and people's resistance. President Ho Chi Minh said: "A clenched hand forms a fist. If stretched out, it is easy to break each finger. We must have a way to force the enemy's mobile army to divide into five or seven pieces to destroy and completely defeat them."

To break General Nava's plot to concentrate 84 battalions in a short time in order to create a strong mobile force to attack us, our army and people proactively organized attacks in many important strategic directions, such as sending troops to liberate Lai Chau, forcing the enemy to land troops in Dien Bien Phu to defend the Northwest; together with the Pathet Lao troops to attack Tha Khet and Lower Laos, forcing the enemy to divide their main forces; attacking the Northern Central Highlands forcing the enemy to divide their forces to defend Buon Ma Thuot, Tuy Hoa, and Pleiku. At the same time, in the enemy's rear, the Northern Delta, the South Central Coast, the Southeast, and the Southwest, guerrilla warfare was active.

The effectiveness of the widespread and intertwined people's war situation made the French Expeditionary Command, already in a difficult situation, even more confused, helpless, and without a way out in the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954.

Faced with the rich military situation and forms of operations of our army and people, during the people's war, nearly half a million French and puppet troops, along with 500 aircraft of various types, nearly 1,000 tanks, armored vehicles and hundreds of enemy warships, were forced to disperse and spread thin across the vast Indochina battlefield, unable to rescue their comrades in danger at Dien Bien Phu.

President Ho Chi Minh's ideology that directed the resistance was people's war, long-term resistance, combining two forms of guerrilla and conventional warfare... In the early years of the resistance, our army and people implemented the motto "guerrilla warfare is fundamental, mobile warfare is auxiliary". Over time, the combat motto gradually moved from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare, from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and siege warfare, always closely and flexibly combining those forms of warfare.

In the Winter-Spring campaign of 1953-1954, based on the correct resistance line, we built a widespread people's war strategy throughout the North, Central and South. The effectiveness of that strategy deeply penetrated the invaders' weak point - the contradiction between concentrating and dispersing forces.

From there, it can be said that we “led” the French army to the dangerous battle area of ​​Dien Bien Phu. We also successfully and creatively solved problems in the art of campaign and tactics. Changing the combat motto from “fight fast, win fast” to “fight steady, advance steady” was a decision that led to victory in the decisive strategic battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Besides, we also implemented the policy of dividing the sky, neutralizing airport runways to destroy enemy air firepower, supply lines, and logistics, forcing the enemy to have increasingly difficult logistics and weapons... While we protected our logistics and supply lines, ensuring victory.

The glorious victory of Dien Bien Phu, which is both national and epoch-making, demonstrates the strategic vision and creative genius of the Party Central Committee's Politburo and President Ho Chi Minh, the initiative and creativity of the Central Military Commission and the General Command; and the ingenious, brave and indomitable fighting spirit of our army and people.

The strategic battle of Dien Bien Phu was truly a battle of wits between our side and the French at the decisive moment of the war. That historic victory defeated the enemy's will to invade and all war tactics, both in terms of war leadership, military art, strategy, campaign art and tactics.

After 56 days and nights of fighting, through three attacks, our army destroyed the entire Dien Bien Phu stronghold, successfully ending the resistance war against French colonialism and American intervention, completely defeating the will to invade and the highest military efforts of French colonialism in the war of aggression against Indochina, forcing them to sign the Geneva Agreement (July 1954), ending the war of aggression against Vietnam.