The policy of 'fighting firmly, advancing firmly' and the logistical problem in the Dien Bien Phu campaign

At the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, General Giap demonstrated great flexibility and determination by transporting primitive artillery and anti-aircraft weapons into a seemingly impregnable area.

In his memoirs, he recounted the arduous days of clearing the way for troops to drag anti-aircraft guns to the enemy attack site. General Vo Nguyen Giap did what the enemy considered impossible without modern means, he made a powerful stronghold group stand still in the middle of the majestic Viet Bac mountains, and the Vietnamese people did the rest - providing what was needed to fight for victory in this battle.

There are turning points in a battle that are decided in a single moment, with the Dien Bien Phu battle being the most important turning point when General Vo Nguyen Giap and his command decided to switch from the strategy of “fighting fast, winning fast” to “fighting steadily, advancing steadily”. By choosing to fight step by step, we can absolutely concentrate our superiority in troops and firepower on each battle, ensuring victory for each battle.

We can attack when we want, attack where we want, attack when we are fully prepared and sure of victory, attack, otherwise we won't attack; hold places that need to be held and can be held, hold, otherwise we won't. We have the conditions to exploit the enemy's biggest weakness, which is that the supply transport is completely dependent on air routes: we will gradually limit and eventually completely eliminate their supply sources, and the biggest advantage is "fighting firmly and advancing firmly" in accordance with the combat level of the troops, with our organizational and command capabilities.

Dien Bien Phu was the only battle in the resistance war against France, both we and France proactively chose the location, determined to put all our best efforts in a final strategic battle, the success or failure of the entire war politically, militarily, and diplomatically depended largely on this battle.

While the French generals considered the Dien Bien Phu stronghold as the Verdun of Asia – a terrifying, impregnable stronghold, an invincible “porcupine” in the mountains and forests of the Northwest with solidly positioned bases that could support each other under the cover of artillery and aircraft; for us, it was a place where we could see a clear goal: we must find a way to pluck out all the quills of the porcupine, completely destroy the Dien Bien Phu stronghold and end the resistance war against the French that had lasted nearly 9 years.

Dien Bien Phu is certainly not the only battle that demonstrated the pure military thinking, the utmost effort, the willingness to sacrifice for national independence and the unparalleled creativity of the Vietnamese army and people against the enemy. This is also the battle that made the French admit their biggest strategic mistake.

That mistake started from accepting the decisive battle in Dien Bien valley, to being subjective, misjudging the enemy's strength and most importantly, not being able to imagine all the things that the Vietnamese people could do for their country.

The bicycles, the "divine" means of transport, along with the extraordinary efforts of the rear for the battle, are the most vivid proof of the spirit of all for the final victory of our people.