From Dien Bien Phu Campaign to the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign

The victory of the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, culminating in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign in April 1975, marked a milestone after 117 years of our country being free of colonial and imperialist invaders.

"The common mourning of both French colonialism and American imperialism"

President Ho Chi Minh pointed out many times that, in the liberation war of colonial peoples against colonialists and imperialists, at first it was always a fight of the weak against the strong. To defeat a stronger enemy, one must not only rely on will but "must have a very talented strategy".

In military struggle, it is a sure-win strategy, battle, campaign until complete victory. Such a strategy was planned by President Ho Chi Minh and our Party from the beginning of the resistance war, leading to the "earth-shaking" victory of Dien Bien Phu. After that, the mark of Dien Bien Phu was deeply engraved in the golden history of the resistance war against the US to save the country (1954-1975).

When the French colonialists returned to invade our country, responding to President Ho Chi Minh's call for national resistance (December 19, 1946), our army and people attacked urban areas (North of the 16th parallel), where the enemy troops were concentrated in large numbers and strong, taking the initiative to move into long-term fighting, a strategic motto of the resistance. After the initial victory, our army and people continued to win in the Viet Bac Campaign in the Fall-Winter of 1947, defeating the enemy's strategy of fighting quickly and winning quickly.

After the Viet Bac Campaign in the Fall-Winter, our resistance grew to an important level in both position and strength. On that basis, in the Fall-Winter of 1950, our army launched an attack on the enemy at the border and won a resounding victory. That victory broke the enemy's siege and blockade, demonstrating the strength of the Army and the leapfrog development of the resistance. From the Fall-Winter Border Campaign (1950), we regained the strategic initiative and continuously won victories in many offensive and counter-offensive campaigns: Hoa Binh (1951-1952), Tay Bac (1952), Upper Laos (1953)...

Meanwhile, the French army sank deeper into the quagmire of war. The only way out for France was to rely entirely on the United States, asking for more aid to intensify the war of aggression, gain a decisive military victory, and end the war with honor. As for the United States, they had long harbored the intention of deceiving the French to monopolize Indochina.

When conditions did not allow for the realization of that ambition, the US intervened more deeply in the war of aggression against Indochina, gradually encroaching on France's rights, increasing financial and weapons aid, thereby forcing France to prolong, expand, and internationalize the war. The Navarre military plan with the aim of turning the situation of the Indochina war was the result of the Franco-American agreement and was part of that general plot. From our army's move, the French colonialists concentrated their maximum strength in weapons and means of war in Dien Bien Phu, building this place into the strongest stronghold group in Indochina, the center of the Navarre military plan.

But all the calculations and hopes that the French and American warmongers had placed in Dien Bien Phu collapsed. The victory of our army and people in Dien Bien Phu was complete and thorough in the strategic decisive battle, the greatest and most glorious victory in the entire resistance war against France, and at the same time one of the greatest and most glorious victories in the history of the nation's resistance against foreign invaders. With that victory, we forced France to sign the Geneva Agreement in 1954, ending the war and restoring peace in Indochina. The defeat of France was also the defeat of the United States. Dien Bien Phu was "the common mourning of both French colonialism and American imperialism".

"Dien Bien Phu for the US-puppet"

Taking advantage of the French army's defeat in Indochina and having to withdraw from there, the US jumped in, first in South Vietnam, to carry out the so-called "filling the void", setting up in South Vietnam the puppet government of Ngo Dinh Diem and then through that government carried out its neo-colonial intentions.

The Ngo Dinh Diem government was built with the help of the US so that internally it could stand on a "three-legged" position (military, political, economic) and externally it had the "protective umbrella" of the Southeast Asian military bloc (SEATO). However, that puppet government could not stand for long. The Dong Khoi wave of the people of South Vietnam from late 1959 to late 1960 shook the Ngo Dinh Diem government to its foundations; at the same time bankrupted the Eisenhower strategy; and neutralized a typical form of domination of American neo-colonialism, which was indirect domination, through the American "advisor" system and the native puppet government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

Not accepting defeat, the US immediately proposed a new strategy, the Kennedy strategy - a new form of domination, the "special war" strategy to save the puppet army from collapse. However, the US empire could not save the increasingly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. In late 1964 and early 1965, the Saigon puppet army fell into a dire situation similar to the French expeditionary army during the siege at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The US was faced with a choice: Either let the South Vietnam Liberation Army decide the fate of the Saigon puppet army as it did with the French expeditionary army, or directly rescue the puppet army that was in danger of being destroyed.

For the US, the fate of the French army in Indochina was not a decisive condition for their survival here. But for the Saigon puppet army, the offspring of American neo-colonialism, it was the opposite. The collapse of the puppet army would be like a chain reaction leading to the collapse of the neo-colonial foundation that the US had worked hard to build for more than ten years, inevitably leading to the departure of the US army from South Vietnam and Indochina. Therefore, despite the high price, the US warmongers tried to maintain their puppet regime by all means, including a direct intervention by the US expeditionary force, like the Korean War (1950-1953). The US relied on its strength, ignoring lessons from historical reality, advice from many sides and Vietnam's warnings about a "Dien Bien Phu battle" awaiting them.

After the failure in the 1965-1966 dry season, in anticipation of our army's next attack, the US sent troops to occupy Khe Sanh (located on Route 9 bordering Vietnam-Laos) and held this important strategic position. By the end of 1967, under strong pressure from our army, the US reinforced Khe Sanh and built it into a strong base, including three strongholds: Ta Con, Huong Hoa, and Lang Vay. The US troops stationed here were often nearly ten thousand, including battalions of marines, artillery, armored vehicles, and tens of thousands of others ready to respond, with strong support from artillery and air force, including B-52 strategic aircraft.

With increased forces and confidence in the power of weapons, the US was determined to "protect Khe Sanh at all costs". During our army's attack on Khe Sanh (from January to July 1968), the diversionary attack opened the 1968 Tet Offensive and Uprising, especially after each failure in the plot to relieve Khe Sanh, the US imperialists were tormented by the haunting memory of "Dien Bien Phu".

They were forced to change their intention of "protecting Khe Sanh at all costs" to fleeing from Khe Sanh. The general offensive and uprising of the South Vietnamese army and people during the Tet Offensive with the opening diversionary battle at Khe Sanh (January 1968) following the resounding victories in the dry seasons of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 was a thunderous blow to the invading American army.

With the "Nixon Doctrine" and the "Vietnamization" strategy, the US invasion in Vietnam intensified and expanded throughout Indochina. They hoped to help the puppet army win a decisive military-political victory to "take charge of the war themselves" and for the US to gradually withdraw from the war, implementing the "de-Americanization" of the war that was proposed after the Tet Offensive. But all was in vain.

The US and puppet troops continued to be attacked by our people and the patriotic forces of Laos and Cambodia from the very first days of their intensification and expansion of the war. Therefore, at the end of 1972, Nixon launched an unprecedented B-52 strategic air raid on Hanoi and Hai Phong. Using the maximum brutal power of the air force and the latest achievements of science and technology in a strategic raid that was unparalleled in the history of war, Nixon attempted to gain an advantage in the negotiations.

We did not intend to turn Hanoi and Hai Phong into a Dien Bien Phu, but when the enemy wanted to do so and caused death and destruction there, we had enough determination and strength to turn it into a Dien Bien Phu. Hanoi and Hai Phong in the 12 days and nights at the end of 1972 achieved a resounding victory that shook the world, similar to the Dien Bien Phu battle in 1954 against France. The "Dien Bien Phu in the air" battle became the grave of "the prestige of the US air force". With this victory, we forced the US to sign the Paris Agreement in 1973 on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam.

The withdrawal of the entire US expeditionary force and the significant reduction in US aid to the puppet army fundamentally changed the balance of forces in the South in favor of the revolution, creating favorable conditions for our revolution to advance and gain new victories. Based on that situation and the strategic calculations of the major countries, discovering and seizing new strategic opportunities, we came to the decision to launch a decisive strategic battle with the US-puppet to gain complete victory in the resistance war against the US and to save the country.

The 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising took place over nearly two months through many major campaigns, culminating in the campaign named after President Ho Chi Minh, which directly attacked the last lair of the puppet army in Saigon, completely destroying the puppet army organized, trained, equipped, and commanded by the US; completely destroying the neo-colonial foundation that the US had worked hard to build for more than two decades, liberating the South, and unifying the country.