The story of General Le Duc Anh persuading John Kerry.

Some time later, the US side automatically removed the POW issue from bilateral contacts and exchanges. Gradually, within the US, many politicians also recognized Vietnam's goodwill, and they campaigned with the US government to quickly normalize relations with Vietnam.

When entrusted with the immense responsibility of carrying out a diplomatic mission – conducting investigations to normalize Vietnam-US relations – after the initial scientific and technical exploration, General Le Duc Anh's next policy was to actively and willingly cooperate with the US side to resolve the POW/MIA issue.

After we "opened the door for exploration" from the direction of "Orthopedic Surgery" and invited the first Americans to Vietnam—doctors from the "Smile Surgery" team—at the suggestion of General Le Duc Anh, the Central Committee decided to appoint Mr. Nguyen Huy Phan as Chairman of the Vietnam-America Friendship Association to act as a "bridge" for communication. The guiding principle of the Politburo at that time was that in contact and relations, we should ensure that the American side did not feel insulted as a great power and lose to us, while we still maintained our national independence.

The diplomatic struggle to get the US to lift the embargo and establish friendly relations with Vietnam was a long process spanning many years, across three US presidential terms (from the final years of Reagan's term, through George Bush's term, and finally near the end of Bill Clinton's term).

Following the successful scientific breakthrough, the next step was to facilitate the return of the US to Vietnam to search for American soldiers missing in action during the war. General Le Duc Anh, while researching the US, realized that the disappearance of American soldiers during the Vietnam War was a very serious issue for the US government. According to US law, when an American soldier goes missing in action for unknown reasons, the US government must continue to pay their salary monthly and promote them until their death is known—only then will the benefits for their family be finalized.

US President Bill Clinton and his wife welcomed Vietnamese President Le Duc Anh and his wife to the United States in 1995.

From the late 1970s, immediately after the war ended, they successively sent representatives to Vietnam to propose dialogue with us to resolve this issue. In the 1980s, they continued their visits, and especially from 1987 onwards, these contacts became more frequent, continuous, and intense. While previously they came mostly as individuals or non-governmental organizations, after we "opened the way" for exchange in medical science, they began organizing delegations to Vietnam. For example: a delegation of Republican Senators; a delegation of former Democratic Senators; a delegation of American businesspeople; The Christian delegation, etc., took place in the first half of 1987. Then, from August 1987, during the final months of President Reagan's term and the first months of President Bush's term, General John Vessey (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) was appointed as a special envoy to lead a delegation to visit Vietnam.

Initially, they insisted on two demands: firstly, to achieve a political solution in Cambodia; and secondly, to resolve the issue of American soldiers missing in action during the Vietnam War (the POM/MIA issue). They considered these two issues paramount to lifting the embargo and normalizing Vietnam-US relations. The resolution of the missing American issue encompassed two aspects: firstly, identifying and locating American prisoners of war still held by the Vietnamese (referred to as POM); and secondly, locating the remains of American soldiers killed in action (referred to as MIA).

Following four visits and dialogues with the Vietnamese side by General John Vessey, the US escalated the issue by sending Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to lead a delegation to Vietnam.

The Cambodian issue has two factors: Firstly, in essence, both the US and China failed in their "Cambodia gamble." However, when it came to a political solution, Vietnam and Cambodia adopted a policy of making concessions on some points to avoid hurting the pride of the major powers, most notably Vietnam's agreement to establish a "three-party government" and to hold free elections supervised by the United Nations. Secondly, by the time the aforementioned political solution was reached, Cambodia's socio-economic situation had revived, its political system was stable, and Vietnam had withdrawn all its volunteer troops and expert teams. Therefore, neither the US, China, nor other countries had any grounds to say that Vietnam lacked goodwill; the US and China no longer had the standing to defend the Pol Pot genocidal regime, so the US had to voluntarily remove the "Cambodia issue" from the "prerequisites" for normalizing relations between the two countries.

The remaining "prerequisite" was the POM/MIA issue. There was an event that greatly impressed John Kerry about Vietnam, and upon his return, he urged the US government to quickly normalize relations with Vietnam. At that time, the US government was still skeptical, coupled with the attacks of some former generals of the "Republic of Vietnam" living in the US who claimed that "Vietnam was still holding some American officers captive at Hoang Dieu Citadel." On November 18, 1992, General Le Duc Anh, President of Vietnam, received a delegation of US Congressmen led by John Kerry. Mr. Kerry handed the British general a letter from President George Bush, which highly praised the cooperation of the Vietnamese government and people in the past, expressed the desire for both sides to strengthen cooperation in the future, and pledged that the US government would promote the normalization of relations between the two countries.

General and President Le Duc Anh reaffirmed Vietnam's consistent policy of considering the issue of missing Americans as a purely humanitarian matter; Vietnam will continue and actively cooperate with the United States to resolve this issue as soon as possible. When Mr. John Kerry expressed his desire to visit the Hanoi Citadel (currently the headquarters of the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense) and the underground structure beneath the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, President Le Duc Anh approved and invited Mr. John and Senator Bob Smith to visit and inspect these two sites.

Mr. John Kerry was truly impressed by the highly cultured and humane behavior of President Le Duc Anh.

Upon returning to the United States from Vietnam, John Kerry declared: "The roadmap for normalization with Vietnam outlined by the U.S. government is not a good policy." He categorically disagreed with linking the Cambodian issue to the normalization process of Vietnam-U.S. relations. He asserted that the information about three surviving pilots being held captive and the discovery of their remains was fabricated with malicious intent, aimed at misleading American public opinion and undermining the normalization process between the two countries. Sometime later, the U.S. side voluntarily removed the POW issue from bilateral contacts and exchanges. Gradually, within the U.S., many politicians recognized Vietnam's goodwill and campaigned for the U.S. government to quickly normalize relations with Vietnam.

Colonel Khuat Bien Hoa - Former secretary of General Le Duc Anh

(According to VNN)