Zone 4 - Central Laos provided fire support to Dien Bien Phu.

(Baonghean.vn) -Implementing the Navarre Plan, in early December 1953, upon discovering our direction of attack, the enemy hastily deployed 6 mobile battalions and 1 French battalion to Central Laos. They vigorously consolidated and organized multiple defensive lines along Highway 8 and Highway 12, especially at key positions such as Ba Na Phao and Na Pe. Along with organizing these defensive lines, the enemy also launched attacks into the base areas of both our allies and our forces, penetrating deep into and harassing the Vietnam-Laos border region.

Our artillery concentrated its firepower on the Dien Bien Phu stronghold.

Determined to share the burden of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Inter-Regional Command reinforced the 280th Volunteer Regiment and added 200 cadres to the Central Laos Cadre Committee. Comrade Vo Thuc Dong, Political Commissar of Inter-Region 4, was assigned to directly serve as Secretary and Political Commissar of the Lao Volunteer Army Cadre Committee.

On December 10, 1953, the Commander of the Central Laos region, Kham Tay Xi Phan Don, and the Secretary of the Party Committee, Vo Thuc Dong, Commander of the 280th Regiment of Truong Sinh, held a meeting to finalize the operational plan between our forces and our allies. The meeting concluded: “Winning the Central Laos campaign will thwart the Navarre Plan’s plot to draw in and tie down our forces in Laos. It will also thwart the plot to create a ‘cross-line’ in Indochina between Central Laos and Vietnam, contributing to the Dien Bien Phu campaign and other campaigns to achieving complete victory in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring War.”

Following the coordinated plan, the Laotian side organized an additional 5 Pathet Lao companies, while our side urgently established transport stations from Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces to Central Laos. Ha Tinh province and 3 districts in Nghe An province were assigned by the Central Committee the task of supplying food and provisions for the Central Laos campaign.

With the operational motto of: Proactive, flexible, surprise, decisive attack, and complete annihilation, the Joint Command of the Central Laos Campaign assigned the 325th Division the task of cutting off Highway 13, the enemy's main North-South Indochina transportation route in Laos. Having lost a large portion of their forces, the enemy was forced to deploy mobile troops to defend Central Laos, thus gradually undermining General Navarre's concentration of forces in North Vietnam.

On December 12, 1953, while units were marching and setting up positions to attack the enemy in Central Laos, on the main battlefield in Northern Vietnam, the 316th Division opened fire and launched an offensive to liberate Lai Chau. The strategic offensive of the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign began.

On December 22, 1953, the 101st Regiment won a major victory in its first battle of the campaign at Kham He, destroying a European-African battalion and a 105mm artillery company. At dawn on December 23, the entire unit opened fire simultaneously, achieving a great victory at Kha Ma, destroying another European-African battalion and capturing 90 enemy soldiers. The victory at Kha Ma paved the way for our forces to shatter the enemy's defenses along Highway 12. The enemy hastily fled from Highways 8 and 12, regrouping at Nhommarat and Thakhek.

At noon on December 23, 1953, the 66th Regiment crossed the Xebangphai River and attacked, destroying the 2nd African-European Battalion and the Laotian puppet forces at Pa Cuoi. On the same day, the 101st Regiment swept through enemy resistance strongholds from Bi Lan to Na Hang. In a state of panic, at Cam Cot, the enemy had to flee by plane to Savannakhet, abandoning 74 military vehicles. Faced with the fierce offensive of the Laotian-Vietnamese Joint Forces, the enemy had to abandon Thakhek and retreat to Seno. We proactively consolidated the liberated areas and pursued the remaining enemy troops. On January 24, 1954, Navarre was forced to send an additional 4 mobile battalions, 3 paratrooper battalions, and 3 artillery battalions to Central Laos, bringing the total number of troops there to a record 26 battalions. Seno became a cauldron of enemy fire, a development that was unexpected and beyond Navarre's control.

With overwhelming momentum and coordinated firepower with the Dien Bien Phu front, the Central Laos Campaign Command concentrated its forces to deliver decisive blows to Seno, Lang Khang, Ba Na Phao, Mu Gia, Ban Bo, etc. At the same time, victories from Dien Bien Phu reached the front lines. The "Emulation with Dien Bien Phu" movement was vibrant in our units and those of our allies.

In late April 1954, the 101st Regiment was tasked with advancing southward, joining forces with the Issarach Liberation Army (Cambodia) to continuously attack the enemy, liberating Buong Sai and Xieng Pang, and advancing close to the Mekong River to liberate most of Kampong Cham. The Northeast Cambodian base was connected to Lower Laos, Central Laos, and the entire Zone 4, forming a continuous strategic network. Nava's plot to divide Indochina into two parts in Central Laos and Zone 4 was thwarted.

During the Central Laos campaign, a diversionary operation to relieve pressure on Dien Bien Phu, the armed forces and people of Military Region 4, in coordination with friendly forces, eliminated 6,100 enemy soldiers (mostly elite European and African troops), seized 1,200 weapons, and over 2,000 military vehicles. They shattered the enemy's defensive lines on Highways 8 and 12, liberating a vast area of ​​400,000 square kilometers and 40,000 people.

The victory in Central Laos contributed to the complete failure of Nava's plan to concentrate troops on the main battlefields in Northern Vietnam and divide Indochina, creating conditions for the friendly army and people to attack and rise up to liberate their homeland and creating conditions for our army and people to crush the Dien Bien Phu stronghold - the last stronghold of the French expeditionary army on Vietnamese soil (*).

(*)Based on the document "History of the Resistance War against French Colonialism in Military Region 4". People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1990.

Colonel Nguyen Khac Thuan