Why Russia Will Not Use Massive Military Attack on Ukrainian Territory

The West is too sensitive while Russia is very cautious.

Last year, as Russia massed troops along its border withUkraine, many people are concerned about the possibility of some kind of invasion. Many Western leaders have repeatedly warned about this scenario.

To date (early 2022), Moscow has denied any intention to do so (sending troops into Ukraine) although it has not withdrawn its troops from the border area. Some observers have interpreted such Russian denials as untrue and have even accused Russian officials of preparing a “false flag” attack (that is, to fabricate an attack by the opponent to have an excuse to respond militarily - ND).

Russian armored vehicles in Crimea in January 2022. Photo: AP.

But a closer look at Russia’s geopolitical behavior over the past two decades suggests that Russian officials have no reason to lie to the international community. For Russia, a large-scale war in Ukraine would be inconsistent with the way Russia has traditionally used hard power in geopolitical chess games. The experiences of Georgia, Syria, Libya, and now Ukraine all demonstrate that Russia tends to pursue a policy of efficiency in terms ofexpense.

In each case, the Russian government understood the risks on the ground, carefully analyzed the benefits and costs, and set clear and limited goals for the use of hard power.

The policy of focusing on cost-effectiveness is a highly conscious choice for Russia because Russian policymakers clearly understand that they do not have the necessary means to sustain a large-scale war.

Russia's minimal costs in previous Georgia, Syria, Libya cases

Russia made cost calculations before the outbreak of the Georgian war in 2008, in which Russia sided with rebels in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia against the Georgian government.

At the time, Russian forces faced a relatively unthreatening opponent and easily defeated Georgian troops in South Ossetia in just a few days. Russian troops then crossed the border into Georgian territory, stormed the city of Gori, and then stopped. Having achieved their goal of pushing Georgian troops out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Moscow was ready to open the door to European mediation.

At that time, the Russian army was fully capable of cutting Georgia in two, gaining control over the oil and gas transit routes fromAzerbaijanto Türkiye and paralyze Georgia's economy and political system, and then use these victories to bargain for the Georgian government to recognize the independence of the aforementioned breakaway regions. But the costs of such operations at the regional and global levels were too great for Russia, so they effectively stopped at a limited campaign.

Russia took a similar approach when it intervened in Syria to shore up President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2015. Moscow did not deploy a large ground force, as the United States did in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, it limited its hard power to fighter jets, special forces, mercenaries, military advisers, and naval vessels. To further reduce the risk, Russian diplomats have engaged with a wide range of actors, including the United States, Israel, andTürkiyeat different stages of the war. These diplomatic efforts were aimed at ensuring that Syrian rebels were not supplied with anti-aircraft weapons, thereby ensuring air superiority for Russian and Syrian forces.

At that time, Russia’s extensive bombing of rebel-held areas effectively supported Syrian government forces and helped them transition from defense to offense. Within months, Syrian forces, backed by Russian and Iranian forces, were able to retake large swaths of territory. Over the next three years, the Syrian army pushed the rebels out of seven strongholds and limited their presence to the northwest of the country. Russia achieved its goal – preserving his regime.Assad, at a minimal cost, both financially and in terms of casualties. In addition, Russia also achieved diplomatic results against Western powers on the international stage.

When invited to intervene in the Libyan conflict, Russia made even less of a commitment, but it still achieved much. Its involvement was limited to the deployment of mercenaries and the provision of weapons to General Khalifa Haftar, who controlled the eastern part of the country. Although Haftar’s offensive on the capital Tripoli ultimately failed, Russia did not find itself on the losing side. On the contrary, Russia positioned itself as a mediator between the Libyan government and Haftar, gaining a significant place at the negotiating table, along with other stakeholders, both regional and Western.

Russia's calculations in Ukraine

Russia took a similar cost-effectiveness approach when it intervened in Ukraine in 2014 following the Maidan riots against then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.

Russia did not launch a massive invasion of its much smaller neighbor. Instead, it reportedly deployed unmarked forces to the Crimean peninsula, where its Black Sea Fleet is headquartered. Russian forces took control of Crimea smoothly. Russia held a referendum and claimed that the annexation was based on “the will of the people.” Russia then said nothing about the rest of Ukraine. For Russia, total war was not the method, and the capture of Kiev was not the goal. Instead, it supported the rebels in eastern Ukraine. In this way, it still exerted influence over Ukraine at minimal cost.

Eight years after the annexation of Crimea, Russia has yet to change that approach, despite the West's often frightening scenarios.

Russia still has the ability to exert influence over Kiev through the Donbass region. Therefore, the Russian military buildup near the Ukrainian border is aimed primarily at the West, not at Kiev. Moscow wants to force the West to sit down and talk about European security. The strategy seems to be working. This is the first time since 1991 that the West has seriously discussed European security with Russia.

Moscow wants to compromise on a number of issues, including halting the deployment of long-range ballistic missiles in Europe and limiting military exercises near Russia’s borders. On December 17, 2022, Moscow published a proposal outlining its demands for both NATO and the United States.

What happens next?

As long as the Kremlin feels it has not received security guarantees, it will likely continue to maintain military pressure on Ukraine’s borders. It could deploy long-range ballistic missiles in Belarus or even escalate tensions in some nearby flashpoint, such as Georgia. It could also hold exercises closer to Western Europe, like the recent naval exercises near Ireland. Other options for Russia include deploying hypersonic missiles on its submarines or placing long-range missiles in Venezuela near the United States.

All of the above solutions are still within the framework of Russia's calculations of cost-effectiveness. Thus, the probability of a full-scale war is very low./.