"Fast, faster..." - the secret command of the art of seizing opportunities

The telegram was both an order and a call to encourage the commanders and soldiers on the battlefield at an extremely important moment of the war.

Exactly 40 years ago, on April 7, 1975, all our troops in the South received an urgent telegram from General Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap: “Faster, faster, bolder, bolder, seize every hour and minute to rush to the battlefield to liberate the South, fight to the death and win completely”. The telegram was both an order and a call to encourage the commanders and soldiers on the battlefield at an extremely important moment of the war.

From the perspective of military historians as well as soldiers on the battlefield, the historic telegram will last forever - becoming a secret command of the art of seizing opportunities.

Order of General Vo Nguyen Giap (Photo: Archive)

The telegram dated April 7, 1975 with the content "faster, faster, bolder, more daring, seize every hour and minute to rush to the battlefield to liberate the South, fight to the death and win completely. Immediately convey to Party members and soldiers", signed with the word Van below, was born from the General Headquarters of the campaign D67 in the Hanoi Citadel area. The telegram was immediately coded and transmitted to the commanders of the troops participating in the liberation of the South.

As the person honored to directly transmit the historic secret order, Mr. Nguyen Ba Liu - a signalman of the heroic 25th Brigade recalled that when this historic telegram reached him, like all other telegrams, it was coded so he did not understand the content. The working atmosphere at that time was very urgent.

On the morning of April 7, 1975, at the beginning of his shift, the Battalion Commander instructed him to ensure continuous communication, to receive incoming telegrams, and to send them out quickly, neatly, and with absolute accuracy. The signal was good, the operation was quick, and the codes on the telegrams were transmitted by him in the language of "crackling" telegrams, so it only took about 15 minutes to complete the transmission. However, it was not until after the liberation day of April 30, 1975 that he learned that he was the one who sent this historic telegram.

Mr. Nguyen Ba Liu confided that at that time, he only knew how to determine the goal of completing the task of ensuring communication in all situations. Later, he learned that the telegram was from General Vo Nguyen Giap. He was also very proud of having completed the historical responsibility assigned to him by the army.

For Lieutenant General Khuat Duy Tien, former Chief of Operations of the 3rd Corps, a spearhead of the attack to liberate the South, the telegram that was transmitted to him was an urgent order to attack, a message to quickly seize the opportunity. Following the order, the corps immediately mobilized its forces to urgently accelerate their advance to liberate Saigon.

According to Colonel Nguyen Van Huu, former doctor of the Tay Nguyen Army Corps, the clear and decisive attack message seemed to convey a new source of inspiration and strength, like a trumpet call, causing soldiers like him to tirelessly accelerate their march towards the enemy's lair. For him, the feeling when he was given this historic secret order was still fresh, as if he had just finished the battle in Buon Ma Thuot, then accelerated even further to go straight from Buon Ma Thuot to the plains, to liberate the airport in Phan Rang.

Soldiers marching in the Central Highlands campaign. Photo: VNA

In the historical context, the "lightning-fast" telegram was also an important directive to implement the opportunistic plan. Colonel, Associate Professor, Dr. Tran Ngoc Long, former Deputy Director of the Vietnam Military History Institute, analyzed: After the Central Highlands campaign, a new opportunity opened up, the Politburo, the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission decided to turn the strategic offensive into a strategic general offensive. From the initial goal of liberating the South in 2 years 1975 - 1976, it was shortened to liberate in 1975. In particular, after the victory of the Tri Thien - Hue and Da Nang campaigns, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was falling into a strategic collapse, a great opportunity to liberate the South opened up.

On March 31, the Politburo decided to launch a general offensive to liberate the South. Thus, from determining to liberate the South in 1975, the Politburo decided to shorten it, liberating it before the rainy season, specifically in April. When the opportunity opened up, the telegram was a timely order for our troops on the battlefield to carry out the plan to seize the opportunity, quickly form spearheads, form a siege and advance towards the last lair of the Republic of Vietnam government.

Associate Professor Dr. Tran Ngoc Long analyzed: “If we do not seize the opportunity, if we delay, on the one hand, the enemy army will have the conditions to recover, readjust its strategic deployment and recover to hold out, then the war will be prolonged. Furthermore, the Vietnam War has been highly internationalized, so the influence of major countries on this war is very large, if we do not seize the opportunity, we will let the intervention of some countries dominate and cause certain difficulties for us, including the goal of completely liberating the South in April.”

The order "Faster, faster, bolder, bolder, seize every hour and minute to rush to the battlefield to liberate the South, fight decisively and win completely" that General, Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap drafted on behalf of the Central Military Commission's Standing Committee is like a slice of history. Looking at it, we can see the grasp of opportunity, the strategic vision of the Party, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission, paving the way for the Great Victory of Spring 1975, liberating the South, and unifying the country.

According to VOV