Amazing Feint

Exactly 40 years ago, at 2:00 p.m. on February 28, 1975, the diversionary battle to deceive the enemy that opened the 1975 Spring Central Highlands Campaign began. All types of firepower of the 968th Division simultaneously bombarded the targets: Plei-cu Town, Cu Hanh Airport, Ham Rong Base, Kon Tum Town, then the infantry practiced attacking the enemy in both Kon Tum and Plei-cu directions... The diversionary operation to deceive the enemy in the Central Highlands Campaign and in later campaigns was a unique, ingenious, and creative military art that contributed to the Great Victory of Spring 1975.

Before the outbreak of the 1975 war, the Central Highlands was pressed by us from two sides. In the north, the 10th Division was approaching the north of Kon Tum town to Vo Dinh (3-hole culvert). In the west, the 320th Division was approaching Plei-cu town. To form a siege and separate the Central Highlands from the enemy's Military Regions 1 and 3, before attacking the Central Highlands, we had cut both vital routes connecting the plains with the Central Highlands, National Highways 19 and 21 in the east and dividing National Highway 14 in the south. The enemy only had supply routes and air support, but the Kon Tum and Plei-cu airports were within artillery range and Hoa Binh Airport was included in the attack plan of our special forces and infantry. Units had prepared combat plans for areas where air landings were possible.

Map of the Central Highlands Campaign from March 4 to April 3, 1975. Photo courtesy

On January 9, 1975, the Central Military Commission held a meeting to implement the Politburo's Resolution on the Central Highlands Campaign, deciding to strengthen the organization, command and forces for the Central Highlands battlefield.

Regarding combat forces, the Central Highlands Campaign Command was reinforced with two infantry divisions: Division 968 from the Southern Laos battlefield replaced Division 10 and Division 320 in northern Kon Tum and Western Plei-cu. Division 316 from the North entered to participate in the attack on the key target of Buon Ma Thuot.

Together with the 3rd Division, the regiments fighting in the Central Highlands and the armed forces of the Central Highlands provinces, we had created a clear advantage over the enemy. Before opening fire, comparing forces, we had surpassed as follows: Regarding infantry divisions: We had 4 enemies for 1, if including the 3rd Infantry Division participating in cutting Route 19 in Binh Dinh, the ratio was 5/1. Infantry regiments: 1.5/1, in which on the key target direction of Buon Ma Thuot, there were the 316th Division, the 95B Regiment, the 24th Regiment, the 198th Special Forces Regiment, the 27th Special Forces Battalion, the 273rd Armored Regiment, the 40th and 675th Artillery Regiments, the 232nd and 234th Anti-Aircraft Regiments, the two Engineer Regiments and the Dak Lak Provincial Armed Forces.

Thus, on the Central Highlands battlefield as well as in the key strategic target direction, we created an overwhelming advantage over the enemy. However, although we had created an advantage over the enemy in terms of battle formation, forces, weapons and means, if during the process of setting up the situation, the enemy discovered our intention and increased forces in Buon Ma Thuot, it would cause many difficulties, even though we had a plan to fight the enemy with a reserve defense. Therefore, to firmly restrain the enemy forces in the Northern Central Highlands, we carried out diversionary measures, deceiving the enemy, making both the US intelligence, the president and the Saigon army General Staff always believe that in the Spring of 1975, the Viet Cong would attack in the Northern Central Highlands.

Feints to manipulate the enemy according to our intentions were also a prominent art of the 1975 Spring Tay Nguyen Campaign. Regarding forces, we used the entire 968th Division to carry out this mission. The 968th Division arrived in the Tay Nguyen on the occasion of the Lunar New Year and immediately began reconnaissance of the terrain, receiving the handover of the battlefield from the 10th and 320th Divisions. The movement of forces was kept strictly secret.

After receiving the handover of the battlefield, from the beginning of February 1975, the division began its mission of decoy and deception of the enemy. A regiment deployed in northern Kon Tum took over the battlefields left by the 10th Division, regularly maintaining reconnaissance, sniping, artillery, and fighting the enemy to push them out as the 10th Division had always done. At the same time, they stepped up battlefield preparation activities such as building mobile roads, sending reconnaissance teams into Kon Tum town, increasing forces to the front, consolidating fortifications, building artillery positions, using vehicles to transport rice and ammunition from the rear to Vo Dinh, etc. Before our above activities, in early February, the enemy had to send the 6th Regiment from the rear to the north of Kon Tum, and to the north of Hill 751, but we fought back fiercely and forced them to retreat.

In the west of Plei-cu, the division headquarters, codenamed “Command B3,” increased radio communications and the duration of telegrams directing operations for “Division 10” and “Division 320.” Enemy planes continuously circled in the west of Plei-cu to locate radio stations and determine the location of our headquarters. B57s bombed coordinates in areas suspected of containing our forces. Once, they hit the division headquarters in the Duc Co area.

With the radio communication system of the two divisions remaining the same and the communication frequency of the radio communication network of Division 968 increasing, the enemy was even more certain that our army's target in the Spring of 1975 was the Northern Central Highlands. Later, American General Tim-met, advisor to Nguyen Van Thieu, had to confess: "By using diversionary measures through radio waves, the Viet Cong succeeded in their plan to pin down the main part of Military Region 2 in Kon Tum and Plei-cu."

The 19th Regiment was assigned to take over all the tasks and positions left by the 320th Division in the west of Plei-cu, as well as the 29th Regiment. The 19th Regiment immediately began its mission. First of all, the division's engineering force and the 19th Regiment coordinated with the militia and people of the villages in the west of Plei-cu to repair the mobility routes for vehicles and artillery, and open new sections of road near enemy targets on Highway 19 west, 5A, and 5B. The division allowed the engineers to detonate explosives to clear underground roads through dry streams.

These roads were still used by vehicles to deliver rice and ammunition to the troops at night and were part of the combat plan to mobilize artillery and anti-aircraft guns to attack the enemy. The defensive positions on the western line of Gia Lai such as Chu Kra, the 631 high point on Road 5A, 5B, and National Highway 19 were ordered to be repaired to serve as a springboard for the forces behind to attack. The reconnaissance teams increased reconnaissance of Plei-cu town, the Plei-cu - Ham Rong section of Road 14, and infiltrated Bau Can (east of Thanh An district) and Chu Goi, capturing enemy prisoners to exploit information... The above actions made the enemy believe even more that we had strengthened our defenses in the west of Plei-cu, preparing for the upcoming military campaign in the Northern Central Highlands.

The combat missions of the 968th Division were assigned during the diversionary phase - the opening of the Central Highlands Campaign as follows:

In the Gia Lai direction, we must simultaneously attack the enemy on Highway 19 West, Highway 5A, 5B, Plei-cu town, and Cu Hanh Airport, forcing the enemy into the mistake of thinking that the main attack direction of our main force is the Northern Central Highlands.

On the Kon Tum side, all the forces that were defending directly in contact with the enemy had to open fire on the enemy, both improving our position and coordinating with the Gia Lai side, creating strong pressure from the north, forcing the enemy to withdraw all the main forces of Military Region 2 - Army Corps 2, the 23rd Division and the special forces out of Dak Lak. In which, 2 attack points were formed on the National Highway 14 axis Vo Dinh-Kon Tum and Ngoc Quan-Kon Tum, combined with cutting National Highway 14 south of Kon Tum, forming a siege and cutting off Kon Tum town.

At 2:00 p.m. on February 28, 1975, the diversionary battle to deceive the enemy began the 1975 Spring Central Highlands Campaign.

The 968th Division's firepower simultaneously bombarded the targets: Plei-cu town, Cu Hanh airport, Ham Rong base, Kon Tum town, then the infantry practiced attacking the enemy in both Kon Tum and Plei-cu directions.

On the west side of Route 19, our firepower, especially the 85mm artillery, fired directly at each bunker and house of the enemy at Don Tam, then artillery, mortars, and DKZs attacked the remaining targets. On the enemy's information network, all units in the front and rear reported to their superiors that they were being shelled fiercely by the Viet Cong, and asked for aircraft and artillery support. In reality, the firepower of the 968th Division was not as much as the enemy claimed because the division only had 1 artillery regiment equipped with 85mm, 122mm, and 105mm artillery captured from the enemy. But partly due to confusion, partly because we focused on the initial targets, the density of artillery and mortars was quite high, especially when the 85mm artillery fired directly at a distance of 1,000m, no enemy structure could withstand it. After that, the infantry rushed forward to capture the enemy's position. In just 2 hours, a series of 3 enemy strongholds in Tay Thanh An were destroyed, we liberated an enemy defense line 5km west of Plei-cu along National Highway 19. In the north of Kon Tum, we quickly captured the battle site south of Ba Lo culvert on Highway 14, the Ngoc Quan high point range, approaching the town.

On March 1 and 2, we continued to pressure the enemy in West Plei-cu and North Kon Tum, sent engineers to Bau Can on Route 19 and cut Route 14 from Kon Tum to Plei-cu, making the enemy even more certain that our offensive campaign into the Northern Central Highlands had begun. As a result, on the morning of March 3, 1975, Pham Van Phu hastily ordered the 45th Regiment, 23rd Division from Ea H'leo to immediately return to the west of Plei-cu town. Thus, the entire main force of the enemy's 2nd Corps was firmly held in the Northern Central Highlands.

Our art of diversion and manipulation of the enemy was so successful that when we opened fire to attack Thuan Man district (March 8) and Duc Lap district (March 9), that is, Buon Ma Thuot was exposed to our guns, Pham Van Phu still could not guess our combat intentions. It was not until 4:00 a.m. on March 10, when our tanks had entered Buon Ma Thuot, that Colonel Le Khac Hy, Chief of Staff of Military Region 2 - 2nd Corps of the puppet army, entered Phu's bedroom to wake him up. Only then did Phu realize that Buon Ma Thuot was our main target, but it was too late.

According to Major General Nguyen Nhu Huyen/QĐND