From the battlefield divided into fronts, attracting and holding the enemy

April 26, 2014 15:36

(Baonghean.vn) -With the strategic intention of turning Zone 4 into a battlefield of division in the Winter - Spring of 1953 - 1954, the enemy force in Binh - Tri - Thien was increased to over 30,000 soldiers. Of which 9% were European and African soldiers, 91% were puppet soldiers, they were organized into 16 occupation battalions, 5 mobile battalions and 3 artillery battalions.

Implementing the Nava plan, the enemy made great efforts to carry out a new plot: Actively sweeping and pacifying the delta; concentrating people in villages; establishing white belts, consolidating defense lines, destroying crops; increasing conscription; strengthening puppet troops and authorities, turning the narrow strip of land Binh - Tri - Thien into a dividing point between the North and South of Vietnam's territory. At the same time, actively using aircraft to intensify attacks on Thanh - Nghe - Tinh.

Đồng chí Nguyễn Minh Châu, Trung đoàn trưởng Trung đoàn 96 (Liên khu 5), quán triệt tình hình cho đơn vị trước khi thực hiện nhiệm vụ. Ảnh tư liệu
Comrade Nguyen Minh Chau, Commander of Regiment 96 (Inter-Zone 5), briefed the unit on the situation before carrying out the mission. Photo courtesy

Implementing the policy of the expanded Inter-zone Conference on November 23, 1953, implementing the Politburo directive, the Inter-zone Party Committee advocated taking armed struggle as the main policy, combining it with political and economic struggle to develop guerrilla warfare, actively attacking traffic, destroying sweeps, effectively combining the struggle between 3 zones: Guerrilla base zone, guerrilla zone and temporarily occupied enemy zone, resolutely attracting enemy forces, spreading out enemy forces to prevent them from concentrating on the main battlefield.

At this time, Regiment 95 had moved troops to Ha Tinh to serve as a reserve for the Command, so the combat command ideology on the battlefield closely combined fighting, besieging and wearing down the enemy with building local army forces and guerrillas.

On December 22, 1953, when the armed forces of Inter-Zone 4 opened fire in Central Laos, the 18th Regiment and local armed forces simultaneously opened fire to attack the enemy in Vinh Linh and Gio Linh, destroying 5 enemy positions in Sen Ha, Cho Da, Ha Tay, Dang Dang and Doc Mieu. Local troops continuously attacked strongly on Road No. 1 and Road No. 9, capturing enemy guns to equip the guerrillas. On December 28, 1953, guerrillas of Vinh Liem commune (Vinh Linh) sank 4 enemy canoes. From December 28 to 30, local troops and guerrillas of Cua Tung bravely fought against the enemy's larger attack on Liem Hoa and Quan Hoa, killing 150 enemies and destroying 4 enemy canoes.

The coordination of operations between the Binh - Tri - Thien battlefield and Central Laos between our army and people destroyed the enemy's plot to connect Route 9, creating conditions for the Laos - Vietnam coalition to win a great victory in the campaign.

In February and March 1954, in coordination with the second and third phases of the Central Laos Campaign, the army and people of Binh - Tri - Thien continuously attacked hard on Route 1 and Route 9. They destroyed 35 large and small bridges and culverts, including Duoi Bridge, Dau Mau Bridge, and Huong Thuy Bridge; overthrew 12 trains, including one military train; and destroyed 18 motor vehicles. The troops of Huong Hoa and western Cam Lo, along with local guerrillas, held the liberated zone despite dozens of enemy attacks. The enemy was confused and stepped up their activities to deal with our attacks on traffic. Taking advantage of that opportunity, the army and guerrillas of Quang Tri stepped up their operations in the plains, infiltrating deep into the enemy's heartland to attack. On January 29, 1954, the 245th Company cleverly broke the two wings of the two enemy battalions with mechanized support, sweeping through the communes of Trieu Son (Trieu Phong); Destroy enemy plots to pacify key areas in Cua Viet, Cua Tung and the plains of Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts.

On February 6, 1954, a local army battalion in Thua Thien secretly infiltrated into the enemy-occupied area and attacked the Niem Pho position. After 15 minutes of fighting, we completely destroyed this position. Two days later, we attacked the Van Thanh position and two bunkers, causing heavy losses to the enemy. In Quang Binh, using guerrilla operations, we destroyed two enemy platoons in Cau Ngan and My Trung. Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces organized eight waves of civilian laborers to transport supplies to Binh - Tri - Thien. Training troops right on the battlefield, the Inter-Zone Command decided to send local army forces to participate in destroying the enemy. Ha Tinh and Nghe An provinces organized 16 reception stations and eight "Nursing Road" groups to care for wounded and sick soldiers coming from the battlefield.

Nava's plot to attack Binh Tri Thien not only failed, but due to our strong activities, Nava was forced to hastily withdraw 800 militia units in Binh Tri Thien and launch the At Lang campaign to reinforce Lower Laos. The enemy forces attracted to the battlefield grew in number.

On February 22, 1954, the enemy sent 5 battalions to sweep the plains of Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts (Quang Tri). The army and people of the two districts eliminated 150 enemies from the battle, captured many weapons, and freed 50 cadres and 200 young men captured by the enemy. In Quang Binh, on March 9, 1954, the local armed forces crushed major enemy sweeps in Hoan Phuc, The Loc, Nguyet Anh, and Vo Xa.

The victories in Binh-Tri-Thien in Zone 4 attracted and held back the enemy, creating favorable conditions for enemy attacks in Dien Bien. On March 13, 1954, our army opened fire to start the Dien Bien campaign. The army and people of Binh-Tri-Thien launched a coordinated operation to overturn 16 trains of 100 carriages, destroyed over 50 vehicles, and destroyed 6 positions and 12 enemy bunkers. Nava's plot to turn the Inter-Zone 4 battlefield into a division battlefield failed miserably. This place became a battlefield to attract enemy forces, hold back the enemy so that the main Dien Bien battlefield could fight big and win big.

Colonel Nguyen Khac Thuan

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From the battlefield divided into fronts, attracting and holding the enemy
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