Profound historical lessons from the Nghe Tinh Soviet Uprising.

Through Party documents, especially the work "Nghe Tinh Soviet" by the Nghe An Provincial Party Committee, four profound lessons learned from the Nghe Tinh Soviet Uprising have been clarified as follows:

1. Firmly affirm the leading role of the working class and the Communist Party in the Vietnamese revolution; constantly fight against "leftist" and "rightist" deviations to ensure the working-class nature of the Party, making the Party strong politically, ideologically, and organizationally; strengthen close ties with the masses, and strive to protect the Party under conditions of clandestine operation.

Vietnamese historical experience shows that without the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party,patriotic movementIn Vietnam, things will stagnate and reach a deadlock, and the workers' movement will at best only lead to trade unionism.

Only with the leadership of the working class and its vanguard party did the movement undergo a qualitative transformation and take on the characteristics of a new form of revolutionary movement, marking a fundamental shift from spontaneous to conscious struggle. A prominent feature of the revolutionary high tide of 1930-1931, culminating in the Nghe Tinh Soviet, was the emergence of a new revolutionary class, the working class, at the forefront of the revolution and its close alliance with the peasantry.

The revolutionary high tide of 1930-1931 and the Nghe Tinh Soviet demonstrated that the Party leading the national democratic revolutionary movement must be a new type of party, a Leninist-style party, fully grasping the working-class nature and having a correct political line.

From its inception, our Party creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of Vietnam, clearly stating the combination of the two tasks of fighting imperialism and feudalism, achieving "national independence" and "land to the tiller," and then progressing to a socialist revolution, bypassing the stage of capitalist development. To implement this line, our Party waged a fierce struggle against the reformist ideology of the bourgeoisie and the narrow-minded nationalist ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. In Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces, the "proletarianization" movement was intensified even before the Party's founding to train Party members and strengthen the vanguard and class character of the Communist Party.

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During the revolutionary upsurge of 1930-1931, under the direct leadership of the Central Vietnam Regional Party Committee, the Party Committees of Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces implemented many innovative methods in propaganda and education for Party members, such as reading books, giving lectures, using poetry and folk songs, and conducting political training classes. In the crucible of revolutionary struggle, these Party Committees matured rapidly.

From February 1930, the entire Party had only 500 members. By October 1930, the number of members had increased to 1,600, and by May 1931, it had reached 2,400. Of these, the Nghe An Party Committee had 907 members, and the Ha Tinh Party Committee had 376. (Thus, the number of members in the Nghe An and Ha Tinh Party Committees accounted for 53.5% of the total number of Party members nationwide).

Figures according to "Soviet Nghe-Tinh" by the Central Party History Research Committee, published in 1962, page 35.

The Nghe Tinh Soviet practiceThis demonstrates that most communist party members clearly showed the vanguard spirit of the working class, were extremely loyal to the revolution, and possessed a courageous fighting spirit, making unwavering sacrifices in the face of the enemy. When arrested and imprisoned, the majority of party members remained steadfast, resolute, resilient, courageous, and optimistic, with boundless faith in the glorious future of the Vietnamese revolutionary cause.

Our Party was not only tested and tempered in the mass struggle but also matured in the struggle of self-criticism and criticism to Bolshevize the Party. One month after the Nghe Tinh Soviet was established, the first plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (October 1930) set forth the task of Bolshevizing the Party as the central element of all Party building work at that time. The Central Committee clearly outlined the principles and methods of criticism and self-criticism within the Party.

The Central Committee of the Party severely criticized the "leftist" and "rightist" errors manifested to varying degrees in the political, ideological, and organizational aspects of the Party Committees of Northern, Central, and Southern Vietnam.

In particular, regarding the Nghe Tinh Soviet movement, the Central Party Committee promptly issued directives to correct the "leftist" errors of the Central Vietnam Regional Party Committee, most clearly manifested in the issue of party purification.

The Central Committee criticized:"The Central Vietnam Party Committee... issued a directive to purge the Party, writing word for word: eliminate the wealthy landowners and powerful figures, uproot them completely. But where are the roots to be uprooted? It's a vague idea, an arbitrary directive..."." (Complete Party Documents, Volume 3, National Political Publishing House, 1999).

The Central Committee's directive on purges within the Party had a significant negative impact on the movement at a time when the French imperialists were carrying out extremely brutal repression, and the Party committees and revolutionary masses were facing incredibly difficult and fierce challenges. Although local authorities did not expel Party members, the mass relocation and reassignment of most Party members targeted for purges from key positions in the Party committees, replacing them with Party members from the poor peasantry with very low levels of education, caused considerable obstacles and losses to the revolutionary movement in Nghe Tinh at that time.

The Central Committee's directive on purging the Party revealed a narrow-minded, isolated ideology and immaturity regarding the principles of Party building and the understanding of our Party's characteristics. The Central Committee also criticized the Central Military Commission for its naive formulation of the "Strategy for Going into Battle" in April 1931 and ordered its withdrawal.

Besides those shortcomings and mistakes, the Party Committees of Nghe An and Ha Tinh also suffered from a number of flaws such as isolation, narrow-mindedness, and "leftist" tendencies in developing the Red Trade Union, the Communist Youth League, the Women's Liberation Association, or the failure to establish the Anti-Imperialist Alliance...

On the other hand, there were also ambiguous expressions of right-wing class positions, such as the admission of wealthy farmers into the Farmers' Association...

From the aforementioned mistakes and shortcomings, the Party has drawn valuable lessons: It is necessary to constantly engage in self-criticism and criticism within the Party; strengthen the cultivation of proletarian ideology, combat petty-bourgeois ideology manifested in both "leftist" and "rightist" tendencies; strengthen the education of non-proletarian Party members; and at the same time, avoid class-based ideology.

Why were Party cadres often exposed? The reason was that when the movement was at its peak, in Soviet-era regions, the distinction between the Party, peasant associations, and the Soviets was blurred. When the movement declined, and faced with brutal repression from the enemy, the most timid elements, temporarily swayed by the movement, would be the first to abandon their ranks. This is why Party cadres were easily exposed; in some cases, the entire committee of a Party branch fell into the enemy's trap.

In the circumstances of our country at that time, with no freedom or democracy whatsoever, and with fierce repression from the enemy, the task of building the Party had to be to make it a party of the masses, closely connected with the broad masses, but at the same time the Party had to maintain complete secrecy.

It is necessary to clearly define the boundaries between the Party and mass organizations in terms of tasks and organization, and to establish a broad national united front – this is the only way to ensure that the Party maintains its mass character while protecting its secrets.

In each Party committee and each Party branch, complete secrecy must be maintained for a number of key comrades, both during periods of heightened revolutionary activity and in areas where the government has completely fallen under our control. The same principle of secrecy must be strictly upheld for mass organizations, including those with many active Party members. Party organizations must be absolutely secret, extremely streamlined, and composed of the most outstanding, resilient, and experienced counter-terrorists, demonstrating utmost vigilance and strictness, guarding against enemy plots to exploit defecting elements to undermine the Party organization.

Maintaining the clandestine revolutionary organization amidst the enemy's brutal repression was a fundamental condition for ensuring the survival and development of the revolutionary movement, guaranteeing the Party's leadership over the masses, and simultaneously ensuring the masses' trust in Party members.

Regarding the relationship between the Party and the masses, the Nghe Tinh Soviet left an extremely beautiful impression. During the fierce trials of brutal enemy terror when the movement was declining, in moments of life and death, Party committees and members did not abandon the masses. They did not abandon the masses – even when, due to a lack of full awareness of their vital interests, they acted contrary to those interests. Not abandoning the masses and making them feel they were not abandoned, always protected and cared for by the Party, was the correct attitude of a Marxist-Leninist Party. Once the Party did not abandon the masses, the masses would never abandon the Party, no matter how difficult or harsh the circumstances.

This has been proven by the Soviet-Nghe Tinh campaign and serves as a painful lesson in Party building.

2. Mobilize the masses of peasants and workers to rise up against imperialism and feudalism, combining revolutionary movements in urban and rural areas, and building a strong worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the Communist Party.

According to Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, the worker-peasant alliance is the solid foundation and the highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin learned a lesson from the Paris Commune about the worker-peasant alliance. However, this was a lesson from failure, a major cause of the Paris Commune's losses. In his works "Class Struggle in France" and "The French Civil War," Marx analyzed that the reason the French proletariat had not yet formed an alliance with the French peasantry was because historical development was not yet complete enough to fully ally the peasantry with the revolution. The French peasantry at that time did not understand or believe that the French proletariat could bring them any benefits. Moreover, France at that time did not have a unified Marxist party leading it, but only a few members of the International branch (mostly belonging to the Peruvian faction).

In his book "Two Tactics of the Social Democratic Party," Lenin also criticized the leaders of the Paris Commune for confusing bourgeois democratic revolution with socialist revolution. In the situation of the Paris Commune at that time, the proletariat should have raised the banner of nationalism, rallied the middle class, especially the peasants, isolated the reactionaries, and attacked Versailles. Because they lacked a correct alliance strategy, despite the numerous leaflets distributed to the countryside, the Commune's efforts were ineffective.

This shows that not every class, including the proletariat, can automatically form an alliance with the peasantry. An alliance requires conditions, the prerequisites being the proletariat's ability to ally with intermediate classes, the need for a unified Marxist party to lead, and the implementation of specific policies for the peasantry.

During the revolutionary upsurge of 1930-1931 and the Nghe Tinh Soviet, it was thanks to the Vietnamese proletariat's ability to ally with the peasantry, the Party's correct policies that met the aspirations and interests of the peasantry, and, on the other hand, the inherent patriotism and revolutionary spirit of the peasantry, that a solid worker-peasant alliance was built.

Imbued with the principle that "the national question of the colonies is essentially the peasant question," from its inception, our Party has prioritized the peasant issue, organizing and leading tens of millions of peasants, along with workers, to rise up and fight against imperialism and feudalism. The collusion between imperialism and feudalism is a characteristic of the colonial regime.

Therefore, the conflict between our nation and the imperialist aggressors is inextricably linked to the conflict between our people and the feudal regime, the foundation of imperialist domination and exploitation. Thus, the task of fighting imperialism and the task of fighting feudalism cannot be separated. The national liberation revolution must necessarily include democratic content. Our country is an agricultural country, with peasants accounting for over 90% of the population. Imperialism, relying on the feudal regime, exploits our people, fundamentally exploiting the peasants. Therefore, national liberation is first and foremost the liberation of the peasants.

During the period of 1930-1931, our Party struck at the weakest link of the colonial-feudal government in the countryside, mobilizing millions of peasants to rise up and fight under the hammer and sickle banner of the Communist Party, the vanguard of the working class.

During the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviet Uprising, the Party Committees of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh knew how to exploit the natural relationship between the workers of Vinh - Bến Thủy and the peasants to mobilize the working class and peasants to closely coordinate their struggles from the very beginning of the movement.

In the crucible of revolution, the worker-peasant alliance became increasingly solid and unshakeable. In Nghe An and Ha Tinh, the two basic types of Party branches—factory branches and rural branches—and the two basic mass organizations—Workers' Unions and Peasants' Unions—were established simultaneously and proactively, forming the basis for coordinated leadership and struggle between the workers' movement and the peasantry's movement.

In leading the struggle, the two Party committees adopted appropriate combined forms and methods, closely linking the workers' and peasants' movements into a unified front under the vanguard banner of the working-class Party. Each workers' struggle included slogans demanding rights for their class as well as slogans demanding rights for the peasants. Whenever workers went on strike, the peasants responded; whenever peasants protested, the workers supported them; workers and peasants relied on and helped each other whenever they faced repression from the enemy. During prolonged workers' strikes, the peasants donated money and food to support the workers' struggle and ensure its success.

In the rural movement, Party committees dispatched capable workers to directly organize and lead peasant struggles. The workers' movement and the peasant movement were always closely linked, mutually influencing, promoting, and supporting each other's development, forming the main army of workers and peasants, growing in number and strength in combat power. This was a conscious, organized alliance between the working class and the peasantry, under the unified and close leadership of the Central Vietnam Regional Party Committee and the Party committees of Nghe An and Ha Tinh. Thanks to the harmonious combination of the workers' and peasants' struggles, the two Party committees mobilized a large number of people to participate in the struggle, bringing the movement to its peak, leading to the birth of the Nghe Tinh Soviet.

The Soviet power formed in the countryside was the "peasant Soviet" under the leadership of the Party, the vanguard of the working class. It can be said that the Nghe Tinh Soviet was a product of the alliance under the leadership of the Communist Party.

Besides the great and fundamental achievements mentioned above, during the revolutionary upsurge of 1930-1931 and the Nghe Tinh Soviet, our Party committed several mistakes and shortcomings, such as: Not fully understanding the unity of the national and democratic aspects in the national democratic revolution, somewhat underestimating the national element; therefore, apart from workers and peasants, it failed to unite a large number of other social classes. Within the working class, the Party only paid much attention to industrial workers, while agricultural workers (plantation workers) were not given adequate attention. In combining the two struggles of workers and peasants, the Party committees had advantages in the early stages, but later, when the peasant movement gained momentum, the leadership of the Party committees became too biased towards the peasant movement, lacking the close coordination and leadership as in the early stages of the movement. These were shortcomings in the process of maturation.

3 - In the national democratic revolution, it is necessary to maximize the national element and attract all strata of the people to participate.NATIONAL FRONT THTUBEFirst, fight against imperialism and feudalism, and win national independence.

The revolutionary upsurge of 1930-1931 and the Nghe Tinh Soviet had a major weakness: the failure to build a united national front against imperialism. This weakness stemmed from the left-leaning policies of the Communist International from 1927-1928, which emphasized class struggle, downplayed the national element, disregarded the broad anti-imperialist front of the entire nation, and considered all landlords, officials, and capitalists as enemies of the national liberation revolution.

The Central Vietnam Regional Party Committee, whose core force consisted of former key leaders of the Indochinese Communist Party, directly led the 1930-1931 revolutionary movement in Nghe Tinh province in that direction.

Although, from the beginning of February 1930, the Party's brief political program and strategy, outlined by leader Nguyen Ai Quoc and adopted at the Party unification conference, restored the spirit of broad national unity in the early period of the General Headquarters of the Youth Union, this correct line did not have enough time to be confirmed in practice. On the one hand, the Party's brief political program and strategy, transferred from abroad, took many months to reach domestic bases under the conditions at that time. On the other hand, the inconsistency in class ideology among the leadership made it difficult for the spirit of the Party's brief political program and strategy to be implemented smoothly in various localities.

By the Central Committee meeting in October 1930, several correct strategic and tactical issues had been outlined in the Political Program, but the brief strategy was rejected. At that time, the Nghe Tinh Soviet had already been formed, and in reality, by the time the Political Thesis of the Indochinese Communist Party reached Nghe Tinh, the movement had already begun to decline.

During the Nghe Tinh Soviet, a vivid reality unfolded beyond the control of the Party committees at all levels. That is, according to the natural law of development, the image of a united national front against imperialism had begun to take shape. This was evidenced in the Central Standing Committee's directive on the establishment of the Anti-Imperialist Alliance on November 18, 1930. Clearly, the practical experience of the Nghe Tinh Soviet was the living material reflected in that directive: "In Central Vietnam, Nghe Tinh had become a red revolutionary high tide, and among the upper classes, there was a division. Some clung tightly to the imperialists, betraying the nation, acting as collaborators and militias to kill the movement. However, this was not widespread. On the contrary, the intellectual classes and some scholars, some middle and small landowners, showed clear revolutionary tendencies. Through fierce white terror, they still tried to cling to the revolution and secretly supported it, especially small landowners and wealthy and upper-middle peasants. Some impoverished Confucian scholars also sympathized with the revolution..."

In Nghe An and Ha Tinh, landlords and wealthy farmers, along with some minor officials—or rather, minor intellectuals in the countryside—had become fragmented, and a large number had leaned towards the revolution. They showed respect and admiration for the Communist Party and the worker-peasant movement. The small bourgeoisie in Nghe An and Ha Tinh, such as those engaged in trade and business, were also consciously inclined towards the revolution" (according to Party Documents, Volume 2 - 1930, National Political Publishing House, 1998).

Thus, although the movement was dominated by "leftist" tendencies, the nationalist element still emerged during the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviet Uprising: "The experience of the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviet, in which the national united front began to be implemented, albeit on a small scale and to a limited extent, is also a historical contribution, a significant creation." (Nguyễn Khánh Toàn - Some Lessons on the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviet).

We regret that if the movement had not been dominated by "leftist" tendencies at that time, and if a broad national united front had been formed on the basis of a worker-peasant alliance, attracting all patriotic forces, the achievements of the Nghe Tinh Soviet would certainly have been much greater. The directive from the Central Party Standing Committee on the establishment of the Anti-Imperialist Alliance was issued late, under the difficult conditions of communication at the time. By the time the directive reached Nghe Tinh, the Soviet areas were already in a state of decline.

Mass organizations in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and elsewhere generally remained "red": Red Workers' Unions, Red Peasants' Unions, Red Students' Unions, Red Relief Unions, Communist Youth Leagues, etc., thus failing to attract a wide range of people from other social strata. In implementing policies, there was a lack of strategy for differentiating among the upper classes. These shortcomings not only limited the depth and sustainability of the revolutionary movement but also caused the nascent image of the front to quickly crumble, especially during intense enemy repression.

4 - Knowing how to use different forms and methodsRevolutions are appropriate to each specific historical circumstance.

To translate the Party's line into reality, using revolutionary forms and methods appropriate to the practical conditions of the movement is of paramount importance. This is not only a science but also an art.

The practical experience of the revolutionary upsurge of 1930-1931 and the Nghe Tinh Soviet clearly demonstrated that distinguishing between the two forms and methods of struggle—when a revolutionary situation exists and when it does—is an essential requirement of revolutionary methods during the struggle for power.

Before a revolutionary situation arises, the most appropriate method is to mobilize the masses to fight for tangible rights, using slogans of a "small" nature depending on the specific circumstances, such as demanding higher wages, shorter working hours, lower taxes, or debt deferrals. Using overly aggressive methods like armed uprising is "leftist," exposing forces vulnerable to suppression and destruction by the enemy. However, if the accumulation of political mass mobilization is done through mere organization, "organization first, then struggle," then the masses cannot be effectively trained.

When a revolutionary situation arises, the Party must raise higher slogans such as: arming the workers and peasants, seizing power. The most appropriate method of struggle at that time is to use revolutionary violence with the political forces of the masses and the armed forces, creating an overwhelming combined strength to defeat the enemy and achieve decisive victory.

During the Nghe Tinh Soviet, Party committees at all levels, from the Regional Committee to the grassroots, used many vivid, rich, and diverse forms to mobilize the masses for struggle.

Considering only the use of the press, it can be said that Nghe An and Ha Tinh were the press center of the entire country during the 1930-1931 period. From the Regional Party Committee and Provincial Party Committee to the District Party Committees, there were always official publications from the beginning to the end of the movement. Besides newspapers, the Soviet regions also used other forms of propaganda such as folk songs, poetry, couplets, and eulogies... reflecting the realities of the movement to motivate and encourage the masses to fight.

In direct confrontation with the enemy, Party committees at all levels formulated very specific and practical slogans for the struggle, tailored to each place, time, and social stratum.

In terms of forms of struggle, Party committees at all levels guided and organized the masses to fight, from the lowest forms such as rallies and demonstrations to demand concessions, to higher forms such as boycotts of markets, schools, and work. The working class in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces took advantage of their forte in the high form of struggle, namely strikes.

Through the struggles held on those anniversaries, the spirit of proletarian internationalism among cadres, party members, and the masses was enhanced, making the Vietnamese revolution even more closely linked to the world revolutionary movement.

The flexible forms and methods of struggle mentioned above during the revolutionary upsurge of 1930-1931 and the Nghe Tinh Soviet contributed to enriching the art of revolutionary leadership and guidance of our Party in subsequent historical stages.