Foreign military intervention: America's painful failure?

Since the end of World War II, bipartisanship in the US Congress has pursued a foreign policy that has evolved over time: training and equipping military forces abroad to extend US influence.

The US has been pursuing this policy in most parts of the world for more than 70 years, seeking to stabilize unstable countries. To date, Washington is cooperating with the militaries of more than 100 countries, implementing large-scale programs such as training and equipping foreign armies in conflict hotspots such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan and Pakistan.

Why is the US determined to strengthen the military of unstable countries?

The principle behind this approach can be understood as follows: by increasing security in unstable areas, the US will establish its position as the most influential superpower in the world, surpassing both China and Russia, as a “peacemaker”, and then prevent potential security threats before they can spread to the US.

Foreign military assistance is common and familiar to U.S. policymakers. In a 2010 article in the Journal, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates called unstable states “the security challenge of the ages,” emphasizing the need to help these countries defend themselves, or if the U.S. is going to send troops, provide them with training, training, or other forms of security assistance.

Over the past decades, the United States has spent billions of dollars on foreign security forces. If you calculate it, the figure is about $20 billion a year. But what does the United States get in return?

Even in the United States, public support for military intervention abroad has declined. The countries that the United States provides military assistance are not doing any better, with conflicts still lingering and divisions that are almost impossible to heal, leading to increasingly dim prospects for peace and stability. The United States’ support policy can only be summed up in three words: “more” – more money, more military equipment, more training programs…

When reality does not match expectations

Experience over historical periods shows that military support in weak and unstable countries is not the “panacea” that the country’s security officials hope for. In fact, the results from this policy show that it is “half-hearted” and does not achieve the desired results.

The biggest problem with America's overseas military buildup efforts is that it sets goals that are too high for its expectations, without fully assessing the country's situation, the structure, and capabilities of the host country's military.

For example, during the war in Yemen that lasted from 2007 to 2011, the US government allocated more than $500 million to support the Yemeni army to fight against the terrorist organization Al Qaeda and many rebel groups. Focusing mainly on the counter-terrorism plan, the US failed to understand that security challenges were not the only problem facing Yemen. Another challenge was the problem of corruption and abuse of power in the Yemeni government at that time.

Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has sought to install relatives in power since coming to power. UN investigators have accused him of embezzlement, extortion and abuse of power.

According to some sources, Mr. Saleh also plundered U.S. aid funds to enrich himself and increase his power. By 2015, as Yemen was sinking deeper into civil war, U.S. Defense Department officials officially admitted that they had failed to track the movement of millions of dollars worth of military equipment and had no idea whether these weapons were being misused.

US efforts to support the Malian military have also collapsed for similar reasons. General Carter Ham, commander of US Africa Command from 2011 to 2013, explained that military assistance to Mali “focused almost exclusively on tactical or technical issues”.

The US approach focused only on training programs without strengthening the overall capacity of the Malian army, including structure, organization, discipline and mission. As a result, the Malian army was unable to withstand the military coup of March 21, 2012, which took away all the military equipment that the US had provided to the army. The coup was caused by the government's failure to provide the army with enough weapons and resources to deal with Tuareg rebels and Islamic extremist organizations in the North.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the situation is different, with the US deploying troops to both countries in parallel with financial support. In these two countries, the US has spent billions of dollars to build armies of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. However, the US has ignored the big questions about the mission, structure and leadership of these forces. Therefore, despite the effort to build the armies of the host countries, their operational efficiency is still not high.

Partner not satisfied?

Despite the US efforts, the countries receiving military assistance are still dissatisfied with the quality, quantity and time that the US has provided them. This is understandable because living with instability and daily threats, the above countries all want to receive immediate help and more than expected. Meanwhile, the financial conditions and military capacity of the US are limited.

A typical example is the conflict in Lebanon. The US announced a $1 billion aid program to help Lebanon build its army after 2005 when the Syrian army withdrew from the country. Washington believes Lebanon needs urgent aid to regain control of its territories.

However, it took more than a year for the US to realize this goal and another year to set up a military training program and provide equipment to Lebanon, including vehicles, light weapons, rifles and night vision devices. Frustrated by the delay from its US partner, Lebanon criticized the US and even sought help from Russia.

Another lesson that could be considered a “bitter defeat” for the US is the Syrian battlefield, when the US was “turned away” by both its Kurdish allies and Türkiye. Despite being a long-time ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the fight against radical Islam, Turkey believes that President Trump never seemed to care about Turkey’s concerns about the decision to arm Kurdish forces in Syria.

The decision to attack the Kurdish forces in Afrin was in response to the US decision to establish a border guard force in Syria, which is mainly Kurdish. As for the Kurds, believing that they have been cut off from US aid and abandoned on the battlefield, they turned to the Syrian government for help to fight against the Turkish attacks.

According to analysts, the US needs to learn lessons from the above failures. Instead of focusing only on training and providing equipment to the host country's military, the US needs to clearly understand the political situation of each country, set clear goals in parallel with evaluating each stage of implementing support activities.

Mara Karlin, a political analyst, said the US needs to look at reality and try to solve the root problems that lead to instability in each country it supports instead of “throwing money out the window” unnecessarily./.