Dien Bien Phu Victory 1954 - Value and stature of the times

On the occasion of the 66th anniversary of the Dien Bien Phu victory (May 7, 1954 - May 7, 2020), we would like to respectfully introduce the article "Dien Bien Phu Victory 1954 - An event of value and stature of the era" by Colonel Tran Tien Hoat, former Deputy Head of the Department of History of the Resistance War against America, Vietnam Military History Institute.

Strategic battle

By 1953, after 8 years of re-invading Indochina, despite mobilizing economic and military potential to a high level, the French colonialists still could not achieve their basic goal of destroying the revolutionary government and resistance forces, re-establishing rule over all of Indochina as before 1945. On the contrary, they suffered heavy losses: 390,000 troops were lost, the occupied area was narrowed, the contradiction between concentrating and dispersing forces became increasingly deeper...

On the other hand, economic and financial difficulties and the struggle movement of the people in the country were increasingly increasing, pushing the French government into a new political crisis. Taking advantage of this situation, the US imperialists increased their intervention in Indochina, actively providing aid to France to prolong and expand the war in order to serve the global counter-revolutionary strategy.

In May 1953, the French Government sent General Nava - who was considered "a strategist who is both a scholar and a military man" to be the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force in Indochina with the hope of soon achieving a decisive military victory, finding an "honorable way out" to end the war. After a period of studying the battlefield situation, in July 1953, General Nava proposed a new military plan in Indochina (also known as the Nava Plan), consisting of two steps.

Step 1 (Autumn-Winter 1953 and Spring 1954): maintain a strategic defensive position on the northern battlefield, avoid engaging with the enemy's main force; launch a strategic attack on the southern battlefield, capture resistance bases, first of all the revolutionary free zones of Inter-Zone 5 and Zone 9; at the same time, make every effort to recruit soldiers to expand the puppet army, focusing on building a strong mobile main force.

Step 2 (from Fall-Winter 1954): concentrate forces on the Northern battlefield, carry out strategic attacks, destroy the enemy's main force to gain decisive victory, force the resistance government to surrender, or accept negotiations to end the war under the conditions set by France.

Both the French colonialists and the American imperialists evaluated the Nava plan as "perfect, suitable", and would bring victory within 18 months!

Implementing the newly proposed military plan, the French colonialists launched many raids, pacification sweeps, and attempted to recruit soldiers; at the same time, they sent more expeditionary units to Indochina. After only a short time, the enemy consolidated and built 84 strategic mobile battalions, of which 44 battalions were concentrated in the Northern Delta.

On our side, at the end of September 1953, the Politburo of the Party Central Committee met to discuss and propose a strategic policy for the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring military operations: Use a part of the main force to launch attacks on relatively weak enemy directions with many loopholes, while seizing the opportunity to destroy the enemy in directions where the enemy can attack deep into our free zones; meanwhile, step up guerrilla warfare in all battlefields behind the enemy's back, actively carry out all necessary preparations among the people and local troops, militia and guerrillas in the free zones to free up the main force to carry out its tasks. The motto and principles guiding strategic operations are: be active, proactive, mobile and flexible; fight for sure, advance for sure, if sure of victory then fight until victory, if not sure of victory then resolutely do not fight.

President Ho Chi Minh chaired a meeting to discuss the Dien Bien Phu campaign, December 1953. Photo: Archive

In compliance with the set strategic policy, the Vietnamese army and people closely coordinated with the army and people of Laos and Cambodia to launch attacks across the Indochina battlefield, forcing the French to disperse their forces to respond. The enemy's mobile main force, which was mainly concentrated in the Northern Delta, was, after a short time, officially "torn" into 5 pieces, standing still in 5 areas (Northern Delta, Northwest, Central Laos, Central Highlands, Upper Laos) and could hardly support each other.

Coordinating with the main force's attacks, in the battlefield behind the enemy's forces, we stepped up guerrilla warfare to protect the resistance base, cut off traffic, attack and destroy more outposts and logistics bases, and threaten the enemy's external defense system... The coordinated, widespread fighting pushed the French army deeper into a passive position. The Nava Plan initially failed.

On the Northwest front, from November 1953, facing the advance of our army, the French command in Indochina decided to send troops to build Dien Bien Phu into a strong base. In General Nava's calculations, Dien Bien Phu held an important strategic position to protect the Northwest and Upper Laos. On the other hand, this place was a fertile valley (18 km long, 6-8 km wide), the richest in the Northwest. That space and terrain allowed the construction of a strong base to attract and defeat the enemy's main force.

By early March 1954, the enemy forces concentrated at Dien Bien Phu amounted to 16,200, including the most elite infantry, artillery, engineering, tank, and air force units in Indochina; arranged into a strong defense system, including 49 strongholds, divided into 3 sub-regions. Both France and the United States assessed Dien Bien Phu as an “impregnable fortress”, openly challenging the enemy to attack.

On our side, after carefully analyzing the situation in all aspects, especially comparing the balance of enemy and our forces, the Party Central Committee and the Supreme Command were determined to launch the Dien Bien Phu offensive campaign - a decisive strategic blow to successfully end the resistance war against French colonialism. General Vo Nguyen Giap was assigned the important responsibility of Commander and Party Secretary of the campaign.

The opening battle on Him Lam hill, March 13, 1954. Photo: Archive

With the slogan “All for the front, all for victory!”, the whole country focused on the Dien Bien Phu battlefield. The combat force was up to 55,000 troops, including 3 infantry divisions (308, 312, 316), Infantry Regiment 57 (Division 304), Engineer-Artillery Division 351. Over 260,000 laborers and 27,400 tons of rice were mobilized to supply the campaign. Tens of thousands of young volunteers coordinated with engineering troops to open roads to the front day and night under enemy bombs and bullets, so after a short time, thousands of kilometers of roads were built and repaired. The preparations on all fronts exceeded all expectations, creating a big surprise for both France and the US.

On March 13, 1954, our troops opened fire, opening the campaign. After 56 days and nights of fierce fighting, overcoming countless hardships, “undaunted by fear and unwavering in spirit”, on the afternoon of May 7, 1954, our troops completely destroyed the Dien Bien Phu stronghold, captured the commander De Castries, ending the strategic battle with victory.

Great historical significance

The 1954 Dien Bien Phu victory of the Vietnamese army and people crushed the highest military efforts of the French colonialists and American interventionists, forcing the French government to sign the Geneva Agreement (July 1954) recognizing the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the three Indochinese countries, gloriously ending the long and arduous resistance war that lasted 9 years (1945 - 1954). At the same time, it ended the centuries-long domination of French colonialism, opening a new step of development for the revolutions of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The 1954 Dien Bien Phu victory broke an important link in the colonial system of old colonialism, opening the way for its collapse on a global scale; dealing the first heavy blow to the aggressive ambition of American imperialism. French historian Jules Roy later admitted that, on a global scale, “The fall of Dien Bien Phu caused terrible horror. It was one of the greatest defeats of the West, heralding the collapse of colonial empires and the end of a republic. The thunder of Dien Bien Phu still echoes.”

From here, the “thunder of Dien Bien Phu” has a strong power to encourage colonial peoples to fight for independence, especially African and Latin American countries; at the same time, it contributes to clarifying the truth of Marxism-Leninism in today's era: An oppressed nation, but if determined to fight for independence and freedom, has the right political and military line, knows how to promote the strength of people's war, the strength of the times, then it is completely capable of defeating the brutal invading armies. As President Ho Chi Minh affirmed: “Dien Bien Phu is like a golden milestone in history. It clearly shows where colonialism rolled downhill and disintegrated, at the same time the national liberation movement around the world is rising to complete victory”.

The Dien Bien Phu victory originated from many factors: the correct and creative political and military lines of the Party; from the passionate patriotism and traditional Vietnamese military art inherited and developed to new heights in the Ho Chi Minh era; from the solidarity and fighting alliance between the three nations on the Indochina peninsula, the important assistance of China, the Soviet Union and the sympathy and support from international friends, including the progressive people of France. But the deepest origin is the love for the homeland, the burning desire for independence and freedom of every Vietnamese citizen.

At 5:30 p.m. on May 7, 1954, the victory flag flew over the roof of General De Castries' bunker - commander of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu. Photo: Archive

The 1954 Dien Bien Phu victory left the Vietnamese revolution with valuable lessons and experiences: maintaining and enhancing the leadership role of the Party, on the basis of correct policies and guidelines, promptly seizing opportunities, making sharp and sensitive strategic directions to concentrate the strength of the whole country to gain decisive victory; implementing well the ideology of "taking the people as the root", knowing how to rely on the people, promoting the people's right to mastery, respecting and protecting the legitimate interests of the people; promoting a solid people's war posture, constantly building a strong revolutionary armed force, especially the main force to be ready to perform well the tasks, especially the key and urgent tasks, the decisive battles; constantly caring for and consolidating the great national unity bloc, taking the worker-peasant class alliance as the foundation, actively fighting for the goal of national liberation, class liberation, for national independence and socialism; Building a spirit of pure international solidarity on the basis of equality, respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and all aiming for the goal of peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.

Those lessons and experiences remain valuable and continue to be refined and creatively applied by our Party and State in the current cause of national construction and defense.