How will China behave in the East Sea?

(Baonghean) - The East Sea is a hot spot that the international community is very concerned about. Politicians and scholars in the Asia-Pacific region in particular and the world in general are researching and making many forecasts about security developments in the East Sea from now until early 2017.

President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping during a meeting before the G20 summit in Hangzhou. Photo: Reuters.

Beijing is trying to restrain?

The dispute in the East Sea has some differences compared to other sea and island disputes. Firstly, the dispute occurs between parties with too great a gap: China is strong, the remaining parties (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei) are small, weak and have little solidarity.

Second, the East Sea is the busiest international shipping route: about 33% of goods and services; more than 40% of international oil and liquefied gas trade passes through the East Sea (15 times more than through the Panama Canal). The East Sea has the interests of most major powers.

Third, the East Sea is China’s only route to the Pacific Ocean and down to the Indian Ocean, the first “strategic stronghold” where the US-China superpower confrontation takes place to shape the world situation in the first half of the 21st century. Therefore, the dispute in the East Sea is the most complicated, fierce, long-term and difficult to resolve compared to all the sea and island disputes in the world.

It can be said that the East Sea's peace or turmoil all stem from China's behavior. Therefore, to forecast the development of disputes in the East Sea or the regional security situation, it is necessary to forecast China's activities in the East Sea.

China’s violations of international law in the South China Sea are typically carefully calculated to keep the international community’s reaction to a minimum. When necessary, they actively create “incidents” to attract attention, while committing extremely serious violations of international law elsewhere to serve their long-term strategic interests.

Typically, in May 2014, China brought the HD-981 drilling rig into Vietnam's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without permission from the Vietnamese government. For nearly 3 months, international public opinion focused on the drilling rig, while China quietly built artificial islands and military bases in Truong Sa.

On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, issued a ruling on the Philippines’ lawsuit against China, rejecting China’s unreasonable claim regarding the “nine-dash line” in general and its unreasonable claim in the Spratly Islands in particular. The ruling of the Court is a victory for the rule of law in the modern world, and China’s heaviest legal and diplomatic defeat in many years.

China was very angry and strongly protested, but did not take aggressive actions in the East Sea as many scholars had predicted. They had to try to suppress their anger until the end of the G20 Summit in Hangzhou on September 5. If they “strike” in the East Sea first, the G20 in Hangzhou would become a boring forum, and there would even be many critical opinions that would embarrass Beijing.

China's illegal runway on Cross Reef in Vietnam's Truong Sa archipelago. Photo: Reuters.

The future is uncertain

From September 6 to November 8, China is likely to take actions that defy international law in the East Sea. Why? First, from now until November 8, the Obama administration will focus on the final stages of the 2016 US presidential election, which is complicated and full of uncertainties. Therefore, Washington will be somewhat "distracted" from the East Sea. Moreover, in the US, there are more than 4 million Chinese voters, many Chinese billionaires have considerable influence on policy makers. In order not to offend this group of people, the Obama administration will find it difficult to escalate tensions with China in the East Sea.

Second, the Obama administration is dealing with many hot issues such as the fight against IS in Syria and Iraq; dealing with Russia in both Europe and the Middle East; and North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. These issues are hotter and closer to US interests than the East Sea issue. Therefore, during this time, the Obama administration will be “soft” on the East Sea issue.

Third, on China's side, they have three options: To escalate tensions with Japan at Senkaku/Diaoyu; to escalate tensions with the Philippines after the PCA's ruling, and to escalate tensions in the East Sea, mainly with Vietnam.

For Japan, this is not the time for China to act aggressively in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands because it will directly affect the US - something China always avoids. Moreover, doing so will stir up the "China issue" in the US presidential election in a way that is unfavorable to Beijing. China is using its economy to attract the Philippines, gradually nullifying the ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal, so it is unlikely to escalate tensions with the Philippines at this time.

Despite the temporary calm with Japan and the Philippines, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that China will take actions that violate Vietnam’s sovereignty and interests in the East Sea. However, it can be said that the “amplitude” of China’s aggression in the East Sea is only within a certain limit, and it is not yet time for them to “overreach”.

After November 8 to before January 20, 2017, China may be plotting to carry out militarization actions in the East Sea. At that time, the Obama administration will be busy handing over to its successor. There are many predictions about China’s activities in the East Sea. The first possibility is that Beijing will try to complete the infrastructure at the two airports of Chu Thap and Gac Ma, and bring fighter jets and long-range strategic bombers into combat duty.

In addition, it is impossible to rule out the scenario that China will complete the aircraft hangar on Vanh Khanh Reef and bring more surface-to-air missile launch systems to the artificial islands China has built in Truong Sa.

In addition, deploying long-range anti-ship missiles with a range of about 400 km and anti-ship ballistic missiles with a range of about 1,450 km on the islands in Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, installing precision radar systems on some islands in Truong Sa, sending warships, possibly even submarines to be on permanent duty in Truong Sa, etc. are actions that are "within consideration" of Beijing. With these possible reckless moves, China is trying to realize its ambition to basically complete the militarization of the East Sea by January 20, 2017 or at the latest by the end of the first quarter of next year, setting a "fait accompli" and using it as "capital" for dialogue with the new US president.

The Chinese military's senior leaders have repeatedly stated that they will establish an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) at an appropriate time. This seriously threatens aviation and maritime security in the East Sea and affects the vital interests of many countries in and outside the region, including the US, Japan, ASEAN countries, Australia, the EU, etc. Therefore, China needs to consider and predict the consequences. It can be predicted that from now until the end of the first quarter of 2017, there is little possibility that China will establish an ADIZ in the East Sea.

Thus, at this rate, until the first half of 2017, the security situation in the East Sea will become increasingly complicated, with many surprises, but there will be no fierce "storms". Subjects, including Vietnam, need to closely monitor and promptly respond appropriately and effectively to protect sovereignty and legitimate interests in the East Sea.

Associate Professor, PhD, Major GeneralLe Van Cuong

Former Director of the Institute of Strategy and Science, Ministry of Public Security