50 years of the Great Victory of Spring 1975: Building determination for troops in the strategic decisive battle
The 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, culminating in the victorious Ho Chi Minh Campaign, is a golden saga, a brilliant milestone engraved in our nation's history as one of the most miraculous epics; a shining symbol of revolutionary heroism and the victory of the mettle and intelligence of the Vietnamese people in the Ho Chi Minh era.
That glorious and heroic feat first of all originated from the independent and autonomous political and military line and the correct, talented and creative leadership of the Party; it was the result of a synthesis of factors, including the great contribution of Party and political work.
Party and political work contribute to thoroughly grasping the Party's political and military lines and the Politburo's strategic determination in organizations and forces and building the fighting will of cadres and soldiers determined to liberate the South and unify the country.
Before the great victories of our army and people on the battlefields, especially after the victory of the offensive campaign to liberate Phuoc Long province (late 1974, early 1975), a new situation was created, the puppet army was increasingly weakened and it was difficult for the US to return to save the puppet army. The Politburo, the Secretariat and the Central Military Commission monitored and grasped the development of the general offensive every day and every hour, and directly and closely directed it. The success of the Central Highlands Campaign - the opening attack of the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising - strengthened the determination of the Politburo. At the meeting on March 18, 1975, the Politburo decided to liberate the South in 1975; on March 31, 1975, the Politburo decided to liberate the South in April 1975.

During the 55 days and nights of the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Military Commission issued many directives and continuously sent dozens of telegrams directing our army and people to grasp strategic opportunities, act "quickly, boldly, unexpectedly, and with certainty of victory", determined to win in the shortest time. Party committees, party organizations, and political agencies at all levels promptly disseminated and thoroughly grasped the directives and telegrams of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the orders and directives of the Central Military Commission and higher levels.
Focus on educating and thoroughly informing organizations, forces and each cadre and soldier to firmly grasp the situation and revolutionary tasks, clearly understand our overwhelming strength over the enemy in terms of strategy, military, politics and diplomacy; the maturity, growth and fighting strength of our main force; clearly point out the deadlock and impotence of American imperialism and the weakness and risk of collapse of the puppet army and puppet government in Saigon.
Party committees and commanders at all levels stepped up information and propaganda work on the great victories of our army and people in liberating Phuoc Long province (Southeastern region), liberating Buon Ma Thuot town and the Central Highlands provinces, liberating Da Nang, sweeping the enemy out of the Central provinces from Da Nang to Cam Ranh... Building the revolutionary action spirit of "one day equals twenty years" and the will to fight "lightning fast, boldly, unexpectedly", the spirit of brave, resourceful, and creative fighting for the forces and each cadre and soldier from all directions and spearheads to attack Saigon, implementing the determination of the Politburo to completely liberate the South and unify the country.
Party work and political work in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising contributed greatly to thoroughly implementing the motto of "lightning speed, boldness, surprise, sure victory"; the spirit of determination to fight and win, implementing the people's war policy, taking the armed forces as the core; closely combining military struggle with political struggle; combining attack and uprising, uprising and attack, fighting the enemy in all three strategic areas, with three prongs; closely coordinating and cooperating between the main army corps with the armed forces and local people; creating opportunities, firmly grasping opportunities to launch strong strategic attacks on Saigon from many directions, many prongs, encircling, penetrating deeply to destroy the enemy...

Party and political work during the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising was carried out on a large scale and scope, with a variety of rich, creative, practical contents and measures suitable for each target group.
Party work and political work in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising were carried out in conjunction with the implementation of the tasks of three major campaigns (Central Highlands Campaign, Hue - Da Nang Campaign, Ho Chi Minh Campaign) on a large scale and scope throughout the Central Highlands, the Central coastal provinces and the Southern provinces. Party work and political work in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising closely followed the situation, tasks and combat practices on the battlefield to determine the content and flexibly and creatively apply measures and methods of implementation.
The major campaigns of our army and people in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising took place fiercely, urgently, and quickly to effectively implement the Politburo's motto of "lightning speed, boldness, surprise, sure victory" and the command of General Vo Nguyen Giap: "Lightning speed, even faster, boldness, even bolder. Seize every hour, every minute, rush to the front, liberate the South. Determined fight and complete victory".
Therefore, along with the work of educating and thoroughly grasping the directives and orders of superiors, the combat tasks of each agency, unit, Party committees, commanders, and political agencies at all levels pay special attention to leadership, direction, and timely consolidation of Party committees, Party organizations, and command organizations to maintain and strengthen the leadership of Party committees and the effectiveness of commanders in combat. Promote well the role of Party committees, Party organizations, and the intelligence of cadres and Party members in passing on the determination and combat plans of commanders and promulgating policies and measures to lead units in carrying out combat tasks.

Organize military democratic activities, promote initiatives, effective combat experience and build confidence in victory, encourage and cheer cadres and soldiers to fight enthusiastically and make achievements. Promote the pioneering, exemplary role and self-awareness of party members and educate cadres and soldiers to heighten vigilance, keep secrets, absolutely strictly comply with instructions and orders of superiors and battlefield discipline. Regularly inform about the situation, promptly propagate and disseminate the great victories of our army and people on all fronts. Build, consolidate and strongly promote political and spiritual factors, encourage and cheer cadres and soldiers to overcome all difficulties, not afraid of hardships and sacrifices, enthusiastically fight in each battle, attack strongly, bring the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 of our army and people to glorious victory.
Party and political work contributed to disintegrating the enemy and propagating and mobilizing all classes of people to enthusiastically rise up, closely combining the attacks of the main force and local armed forces with the uprising of the masses, creating a combined strength in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, liberating the South and reunifying the country.
Enemy propaganda work and military propaganda attacks to demoralize and disintegrate the enemy's ranks are ways to promote the righteous strength of our army and people on the battlefield. During the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, military propaganda work and enemy propaganda work became a sharp and effective attack, contributing to the disintegration of the spirit of the enemy's soldiers, officers and civil defense forces.
After the Paris Agreement was signed (January 27, 1973), the US had to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam. However, the US imperialists still did not give up their plot to invade our country. Before withdrawing their troops, the US imperialists poured nearly 2 million tons of war materials and equipment into the South, providing emergency aid to the Saigon puppet regime in order to help the puppet regime maintain its neo-colonial regime. The Saigon puppet regime continuously launched sweeping operations, "flooding the territory" campaigns, encroached on land, and committed many more crimes against our compatriots in the South.
In the face of the consecutive victories of our army and people, in early 1974, the situation had fundamental changes, in particular, the victory of the offensive campaign to liberate Phuoc Long signaled the weakening of the puppet army. During the General Offensive and Uprising in Spring 1975, Party and political work contributed to thoroughly grasping and effectively implementing the guiding principle of closely combining military struggle with political and diplomatic struggle; combining political struggle with armed struggle; combining three prongs of attack (military attack, political struggle and military agitation)... Party committees, commanders, political commissars, political officers, political agencies at all levels led, directed, and guided units participating in the campaign. After winning the victory in liberating districts, towns, etc., they quickly took over radio stations, well preserved machinery and technical equipment, and used radio stations to broadcast news, announce our victory; propagate and call on the masses to rise up...
Practice shows that, along with the great destruction of the main force on the battlefield, the military and enemy propaganda work of our Army has made the armed struggle always closely combined with the political struggle, combining revolutionary war and the uprising of the masses, both fighting the enemy, denouncing their crimes and promoting the military and enemy propaganda work... making the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 always have the participation and support of millions of revolutionary and patriotic masses, making the more we fight, the stronger we become, the more we fight, the more we win...
Party and political work contributed to building a spirit of solidarity and improving the quality and effectiveness of joint military and service operations in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising.
During the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, for the first time, our Army used combined arms and modern forms of coordinated operations between arms and services. In particular, in the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, we mobilized four main army corps, concentrated forces, weapons, equipment, and vehicles on a large scale, and launched strong attacks from five directions to attack the inner city of Saigon. Joint operations at the campaign and strategic levels placed high demands on solidarity, coordination, and close coordination of the main army corps, between infantry, artillery, armored vehicles, air defense - air force; coordination between main units participating in the campaign with local troops, militia, guerrillas, etc.
Party committees, commanders, political commissars, political officers, and political agencies at all levels have comprehensively and synchronously carried out the contents and measures of Party and political work. They have focused on leading and directing the good organization of combat and solidarity in combat coordination; built a thorough awareness of obeying orders and discipline in joint military and service operations, and done a good job of ensuring...
In practice, in urgent combat conditions, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission quickly mobilized many units from the North, from the battlefield of Military Region 5 and units from the Central Highlands Front to participate in the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising. Despite the urgent mobility time, complex terrain and fierce enemy resistance..., the main army units received guidance, assistance and close coordination from the armed forces and local people, both mobile and fighting, quickly attacking in many directions and directions towards the center of Saigon, ending the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign.../.